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ABSTRACT
Although the conflict formerly known as the “war on terror” is now
in its eighth year, key legal issues governing the use of force and
military detention remain largely unresolved. These questions
survive the Bush administration, as the United States continues to
launch aerial strikes against al Qaeda and President Obama has
indicated his intention to continue the use of preventative detention
and military trials even after Guantánamo is closed. Military victory
is not possible, but good faith application of authority from the law
of war can effectively complement traditional criminal law in
combating the threat. Even if the Geneva Conventions do not
formally apply to this conflict, there is a large body of customary
international law, including many Geneva rules, that should. If the
war is limited to those adversaries authorized by Congress, and the
opposition is validly classified under the law of war, the military
(but not the CIA) can legally target members of al Qaeda and detain
them without requiring a criminal trial. But the conditions of that
detention and any trials that are held must meet international
standards, which they currently do not. Good faith application of law
of war rules also offers better protections for civil liberties than other
proposed solutions, such as national security courts, which offer less
due process than regular federal trials. Such measures start down a
slippery slope of compromising legal standards on the basis of
expediency that can be avoided through the faithful application of
existing international law.
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[F]or winning friendships, of which for many reasons nations
as well as individuals have need, a reputation for having
undertaken war not rashly nor unjustly, and of having waged
it in a manner above reproach, is exceedingly efficacious. No
one readily allies himself with those in whom he believes that
there is only a slight regard for law, for the right, and for good
faith.
- Hugo Grotius, 16251
INTRODUCTION
Although more than eight years have elapsed since the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attacks (9/11) precipitated the so-called “war on terror,”
core legal issues concerning the conduct of America’s response
remain unresolved. Immediately following 9/11, the Bush adminis-
tration perceived the need for extraordinary measures to protect the
nation, evidenced by its adoption of the “war” nomenclature and the
extensive roles assigned to the military in combating, detaining, and
interrogating suspected terrorists.2 But these measures were largely
divorced from legal rules governing their application; administra-
tion lawyers saw the law of war as a relic unsuited to the post-9/11
challenge and crafted narrow interpretations in an effort to avoid its
constraints.3 Their opinions allowed the government to function in
something close to a law-free zone while exercising substantial
executive power.4
This approach met with strident criticism. Many critics called for
strict conformance to existing law, particularly the 1949 Geneva
Conventions,5 while some questioned whether the fight against
terrorism could be a war at all.6 Predictably, these disputes carried
1. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, Prolegomena (1625), reprinted in G.G.
Wilson, Grotius: Law of War and Peace, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 217 (1941).
2. See SETH G. JONES & MARTIN C. LIBICKI, HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END 105-06 (2008).
3. See Dan Nguyen & Christopher Weaver, The Missing Memos, PROPUBLICA,
http://www.propublica.org/special/missing-memos (listing Bush administration legal opinions
relied upon on for its conduct of the “war on terror”) (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
4. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 64-65 (2007); JANE MAYER, THE DARK
SIDE 150-51 (2008).
5. See PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD 144-50, 161 (2005).
6. See Roy S. Schöndorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal
Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 1-4 (2004).
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over into the courts. A host of cases have been litigated, including
five already decided by the Supreme Court,7 yet basic questions still
lack definitive answers. If this is actually a “war,” what interna-
tional law provisions apply? Who can be killed or captured? How
long can those captured be held, and under what conditions? How
may prisoners be interrogated? Can detainees be criminally tried?
If so, by what courts and on what charges? 
The Supreme Court’s decisions have actually confused, rather
than clarified, these issues. In 2004, for example, Justice O’Connor’s
plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held that detention of
enemy fighters was a “fundamental incident” of waging the conflict
Congress sanctioned in the September 2001 Authorization for the
Use of Military Force (AUMF).8 Although not explicitly stated in the
opinion, the authority discussed is logically sourced in the law of
war governing international armed conflict.9 Two years later in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, however, Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion
seemed to hold that the conflict is “non-international,” governed by
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.10 But the law of
war provides no authority for detention in noninternational
conflicts; it must be provided by domestic law, and no U.S. law
addresses this issue or could logically govern extraterritorial
conduct in this realm.11 And in its 2008 Boumediene v. Bush
decision, the Court held that Guantánamo detainees had a constitu-
tional right to habeas corpus review but gave little guidance as to
the substantive law to be applied in judging their cases on the
merits.12
7. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
8. 542 U.S. at 518-19.
9. Id. at 518-21.
10. 548 U.S. at 629-31.
11. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 52-57 (1st ed.
1993); Kevin Jon Heller, Three Thoughts on the Preliminary Detention Report, OPINIO JURIS,
July 21, 2009, http://opiniojuris.org/2009/07/21/three-thoughts-on-the-preliminary-detention-
report/. But see Ryan Goodman, Rationales for Detention: Security Threats and Intelligence
Value, 85 INT’L L. STUD. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/
rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanSecurityThreatsandIntelligenceValue.pdf.
12. 128 S. Ct. at 2274-77.
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The need to resolve these questions did not end with the Bush
administration. President Obama has pointedly distanced himself
from some of his predecessor’s more controversial positions,
including a move toward abandoning the “war on terror” terminol-
ogy,13 committing to close Guantánamo,14 and backing away from
the overbroad categorization of adversaries as “enemy combat-
ants.”15 But Obama has indicated that he intends to preventively
detain some suspected terrorists16 and continues relying on legal
authority sourced in the law of war, conducting missile strikes
against suspected militants sheltering in Pakistan’s remote tribal
regions, and announcing plans to resume military commission
trials.17
This Article endeavors to address this void by critically assessing
what rules should govern a “war” against al Qaeda conducted in
accordance with international law. It will show that, properly
applied, the law of war can play a key role in dealing with the al
Qaeda threat. The widespread view that 9/11 constituted an actual
armed attack offered the opportunity to go beyond the one-time
strikes that followed previous terrorist bombings.18 Unlike the
metaphorical wars against crime or drugs, or the stillborn “war on
illiteracy,”19 key international organizations and Congress endorsed
13. See, e.g., Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, War on Words, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/183251.
14. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Closure_Of_Guantanamo_Detention_Facilities/.
15. See Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay at 7-9, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee
Litigation, Nos. 05-0763, 05-1646, 05-2378 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf. 
16. Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration, DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 200900388 (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/.
17. Statement on Military Commissions, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 200900364 (May 15,
2009), available at http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900364/pdf/DCPD-200900364.pdf.
18. See Timothy D. Hoyt, Military Force, in ATTACKING TERRORISM 162, 164 (Audrey
Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes eds., 2004) (identifying modern terrorist incidents resulting
in U.S. military responses); David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years
Turmoil over the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 132-33
(2008).
19. Remarks in a Leadership Forum in Jacksonville, Florida, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1297 (Sept. 10, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010910-14.html.
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legal application of the armed conflict paradigm.20 This can be a real
war. 
For a short time it might have even been just a war. It might have
been “won” if al Qaeda’s leadership had been killed or captured
before escaping into Pakistan’s tribal regions.21 But even then
military force may have been inadequate. Terrorist cells embedded
in western nations, for example, can only be countered through
intelligence and law enforcement activity, not warfare.22 In any
event, by early 2002 the primary threat was geographically
dispersed into nonhostile states that are not legitimate battle-
grounds,23 and a “war on terror” could not be won by force of arms
alone. International cooperation is now a key requirement, and
“war” at most can only be one component of a larger legal and
political effort.24 Nevertheless, authority can be drawn from the law
of war for direct military action, preventive detention, and even
military trials as adjuncts to regular criminal procedure in ways
that could assist in achieving legitimate national security objectives
while maintaining international public support.25
In fairness to the Bush administration, some law of war pro-
visions, including the full 1949 Geneva Conventions,26 may be
20. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. III 2003)) [hereinafter AUMF]; Lord Robertson,
Secretary General, NATO, Statement of NATO’s Position on 9/11 Attack Against U.S. (Oct.
2, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm)
(declaring that 9/11 constituted an armed attack invoking collective self-defense).
21. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu & Walter Pincus, U.S. Warns of Stronger Al-Qaeda, WASH.
POST, July 12, 2007, at A1; Rod Nordland et al., How al-Qaeda Slipped Away, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 19, 2002, at 34.
22. See JONES & LIBICKI, supra note 2, at 103-08, 122-23. 
23. See infra Part IV.B.
24. See, e.g., Philip Kapusta & Donovan Campbell, How To Contain Radical Islam,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 2008, at K1.
25. See infra Parts IV and V.
26. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]. 
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inapplicable to fighting a nonstate actor like al Qaeda.27 But this is
a far cry from holding that no legal rules govern. There are many
other treaties and a large body of customary law that provided the
basis for thousands of war crimes trials following World War II.28
The Martens Clause, first incorporated in the 1899 Hague Land
Warfare Regulations, explicitly addresses gaps in law of war treaty
coverage: 
Pending the preparation of a more complete code of the laws of
war, the high contracting parties deem it opportune to state
that, in cases not provided for in the rules adopted by them, the
inhabitants and the belligerents shall remain under the protec-
tion of and subject to the principles of the law of nations, as
established by the usages prevailing among civilized nations, by
the laws of humanity, and by the demands of public conscience.29
In other words, customary international law and other accepted
norms govern when there are treaty gaps.30 The law of war takes
precedence over conflicting general rules as a lex specialis during
armed conflict, but international human rights law remains appli-
cable, governing when there are lacunae in law of war coverage.31 So
even if government lawyers correctly identified gaps in Geneva
Convention applicability, this should have been only the beginning
of their work. Legal compliance is an important element in securing
necessary international cooperation in the fight against terrorists.
To succeed, the United States must be seen as a just party battling
27. See David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law
Regulating Military Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55, 76-78 (2006).
28. See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 6-12 (2004).
29. This is the effective 1907 language, differing only slightly from the original 1899
version. Second Hague Peace Conference Convention Regarding the Laws of and Customs of
Land Warfare, Oct. 18, 1907, pmbl., 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens (3d) 461, reprinted in 2 AM. J.
INT’L L. 90, 91-92 (Supp. 1908) [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
30. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 34 (2d ed. 2000).
31. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
240 (July 8).
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an unprincipled enemy,32 as President Bush implicitly recognized
when promising to provide a clear choice “between good and evil.”33
Unfortunately, it has not worked out that way. The world stood
with the United States after 9/11. Today global revulsion over
conditions at Guantánamo, harsh interrogation techniques some-
times constituting actual torture, and substandard military trials
have impaired support for the U.S. fight against al Qaeda34—not to
mention the political costs of the invasion of Iraq, although legally
the invasion is a separate conflict.35 The damage is not confined to
counterterrorism. As Joseph Nye has articulated, the ability to
positively influence global events is composed of “soft power”—
which includes moral influence—as much as military force; and in
alienating much of the world, U.S. conduct has seriously compro-
mised this authority.36
The challenge of successfully combating al Qaeda calls for the
accurate identification of applicable law and the synergistic
employment of rules from the crime and war paradigms to best
advantage. This Article will argue that good faith application of the
law of war ultimately provides better protection for both security
and civil liberties and greater prospects of maintaining public
support, than either continuing to operate within legal loopholes or
creating a new hybrid legal regime. Proposed measures, such as
special preventive detention and national security courts,37 start
down a slippery slope of compromising established legal standards
on the basis of expediency. Further curtailment of civil liberties may
32. See Peter Bergen & Lawrence Footer, Defeating the Attempted Global Jihadist
Insurgency: Forty Steps for the Next President To Pursue Against Al Qaeda, Like-Minded
Groups, Unhelpful State Actors, and Radicalized Sympathizers, 618 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 232, 243 (2008).
33. See George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks at a Photo Opportunity with the
National Security Team (Sept. 12, 2001) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html).
34. See Joseph P. “Dutch” Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees,
Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 1
(2004).
35. Conflict against al Qaeda was authorized by the September 2001 AUMF. See supra
note 20. The war against Iraq was authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
36. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER (2004).
37. See generally BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR (2008); Greg Bruno,
Backgrounder: Closing Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/
world/slot1_20090212.html. 
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seem unlikely today,38 but it was wholly unthinkable eight years ago
that torture would be approved by our highest leaders.39 So we
should be loathe to undertake any further departure from existing
legal standards. The law of war provides a defined set of substantive
rules that can act as a check on government abuses, backed by the
possibility of criminal prosecutions for their violation.
Part I provides foundational analysis, reviewing the threat and
evaluating three existing legal regimes that have been proposed to
combat terrorism—traditional law enforcement, piracy, and war—
and concludes that no one regime can adequately meet the full
challenge. Part II then considers how a “war” employed as a partial
answer would be legally defined. Part III analyzes the recognized
legal classifications that can be assigned to al Qaeda fighters,
combatant and civilian, and the contested issue of whether “unlaw-
ful combatant” is a valid law of war categorization. Agreement on
classification is a critical prerequisite for law of war compliance,
determining in large part who can be killed, detained, and tried and
under what conditions. Part IV examines jus in bello (the law
governing conduct of hostilities) considerations, including how these
rules might be applied to advantage the United States. Finally, Part
V considers how selected measures could be implemented in the
near term. Because Congress has authorized the use of military
force, the President has the necessary authority to act in confor-
mance with established law. Future terrorist attacks on the United
States are highly likely. If a sound legal foundation for responding
to them is not laid now, the foreseeable result will be more govern-
ment overreactions, compounding the harm already done to civil
liberties, national security, and America’s global reputation. 
I. THE CHALLENGE
It has become de rigueur to assert that “9/11 changed every-
thing.”40 This view typically assumes that it was the magni-
38. But see Lara Lakes Jordan, Senators: FBI Rules Could Target Innocent People, USA
TODAY, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-08-20-926742133_x.
htm.
39. See generally MAYER, supra note 4, at 64 (describing White House meetings debating
the reach of executive power following 9/11). 
40. See, e.g., Richard B. Cheney, U.S. Vice President, Remarks at McChord Air Force Base
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tude of the attacks per se that required a military response.41 But
law enforcement has successfully responded to threats ranging from
the rogue individual who destroyed the Oklahoma City Federal
Building to the first terrorist use of an actual weapon of mass
destruction—the nerve gas attacks by Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo cult.42
What really distinguished 9/11 was that it demanded that the
United States finally undertake decisive measures against al Qaeda,
and the size and location of al Qaeda dictated that a substantial
military effort was required.43 The number of fighters trained in al
Qaeda’s Afghan camps has been measured in the tens of
thousands.44 Even if most of these were fighters trained for other
causes, al Qaeda likely had several thousand fighters of its own.45
And in the fall of 2001, just getting to the camps required combating
the Taliban, which harbored al Qaeda in exchange for training and
financial support,46 making it perhaps the world’s only “terrorism
sponsored state.”47
The problem goes beyond apprehension. Criminal law requires
the government to promptly present evidence to a judicial official
to justify an arrest, subsequent detention, and charges.48 When
dealing with a remote and secretive adversary such as al Qaeda,
however, it may be impossible to present evidence in accordance
with the standards and timeliness requirements of ordinary
(Dec. 22, 2003) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov//news/
releases/2003/12/20031223-1.html).
41. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 201-05 (2003). 
42. See, e.g., Kyle B. Olson, Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?, 5 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 513 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/pdf/
olson.pdf.
43. See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES 274 (2004).
44. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates al Qaeda trained more
than 20,000 fighters between 1996 and 2001. Int’l Inst. for Strategic Stud., Al-Qaeda One Year
On, STRATEGIC COMMENTS, Sept. 2002, available at http://www.iiss.org/EasysiteWeb/
getresource.axd?AssetID=514&type=full&servicetype=Attachment; see also MAYER, supra
note 4, at 73 (quoting a Rand official’s estimate that the camps trained more than 70,000 with
approximately 10 percent receiving advanced terrorism training).
45. See Lucien J. Dhooge, A Previously Unimaginable Risk Potential: September 11 and
The Insurance Industry, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 687, 696 (2003).
46. See, e.g., 9/11 Commission Staff, Overview of the Enemy, in UNDERSTANDING THE WAR
ON TERROR 38, 43-44 (James F. Hoge Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2005).
47. Glazier, supra note 27, at 78.
48. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975).
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criminal procedure rules. Individuals may be captured under
circumstances implying affiliation with a hostile organization but
without sufficient evidence to support an actual criminal prosecu-
tion, while the practical need to conduct timely interrogation for
tactical intelligence purposes argues against the provision of
Miranda warnings and any right to unilaterally curtail ques-
tioning.49 Military forces unschooled in evidence collection and chain
of custody requirements may capture suspected terrorists under
operational conditions precluding “crime-scene” discipline. Physical
evidence will likely require evaluation for intelligence value before
turn over to law enforcement personnel. Some evidence, such as
electronic intercepts or informers, may be legitimately classified to
protect the means of collection, complicating use in open trials.
Despite these potential difficulties, criminal prosecution of
suspected terrorists offers a number of advantages, including broad
international public support, and it merits serious consideration
whenever it might be possible. But the challenges just identified
also suggest the importance of exploring legal alternatives, and so
the following sections will examine in turn criminal prosecution,
the potential of applying the piracy paradigm to terrorism, and
application of the law of war to combating al Qaeda. 
A. Terrorism Under Criminal Law
There is an indisputable legal basis for treating terrorists as
criminals. Thirteen global treaties, dating back to 1963, address
specific terrorist acts, suppression of financing, and the nuclear
terror threat.50 These accords typically call upon parties to crim-
inalize specified conduct under national law and create a “no safe
haven” rule, requiring any state finding an offender within its
jurisdiction to prosecute or extradite them.51 Many of these treaties
49. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 227 (2001) (statement
of Victoria Toensing, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=128&wit_id=84.
50. See United Nations, UN Action To Counter Terrorism, http://www.un.org/terrorism/
instruments.shtml (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). 
51. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Counter-Terrorism
Conventions, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/conventions.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2009).
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implicitly authorize universal jurisdiction for terrorist offenses. The
1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, for example, provides
that “[e]ach State Party shall likewise take such measures as may
be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over these crimes in cases
where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite him.”52 The no safe haven principle was reiterated in a
post-9/11 Security Council resolution53 and the subsequent Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly.54
Taken together, these accords combine to create a legal obligation
for nations to cooperate by responding to terrorism within the
criminal law paradigm. 
Federal, and in many cases state, criminal law provides signifi-
cant authority to prosecute terrorists. First, any act of violence
committed within the United States should constitute a violation of
ordinary criminal law, such as prohibitions against murder or
assault. This subject matter jurisdiction includes the ability to pros-
ecute would-be perpetrators under the full spectrum of inchoate
offenses recognized by the American legal system including so-
licitation, conspiracy, and attempts.55 Similarly, terrorist acts
committed on U.S. registered ships and aircraft and at American
facilities abroad likely fall within the set of federal crimes pro-
scribed when committed within the “special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.”56
These general offenses are now supplemented by a number of
specific federal law provisions such as the criminalization of aircraft
piracy.57 Other federal statutes dealing specifically with terrorism
are found in Chapter 113B of Title 18,58 such as prohibitions on
52. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167, 168 [hereinafter Convention on Internationally Protected Persons]. 
53. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
54. See G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006).
55. See Wayne McCormack, Inchoate Terrorism: Liberalism Clashes with
Fundamentalism, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005); T. O’Connor, Incomplete (Inchoate) Crimes
(Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/3010/3010lect03a.htm.
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States).
57. 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (2006).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq. (2006).
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acquiring missile systems intended to destroy aircraft59 or radio-
logical dispersal devices.60 This chapter also includes two different
schemes for prosecuting the provision of material support to
terrorism. Section 2332d61 criminalizes dealings with governments
designated as supporters of international terrorism under the
International Export Administration Act of 1979,62 whereas
§ 2339A63 and § 2339B64 deal with provision of support to terrorists
and terrorist organizations respectively. Providing material sup-
port to a government that supports terrorism may also violate the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).65 John
Walker Lindh, “the American Taliban,” was prosecuted under both
IEEPA for supporting the Taliban and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B for
supporting al Qaeda.66
The robust scope of applicable laws is reflected in a 2006 study
finding that suspected terrorists had been prosecuted for 104
different criminal offenses.67 Scores of alleged terrorists have been
successfully prosecuted68 while proponents of alternate schemes
overstate some of the concerns about federal courts. Postulated
difficulties applying Fourth Amendment search and seizure
provisions on the battlefield, for example, should have little impact
given that courts hold those protections generally inapplicable
outside the United States.69 Experienced prosecutors also believe
most legitimate concerns about classified information disclosure
should be addressed by the Classified Information Protection Act
(CIPA) provisions.70
59. Id. § 2332g.
60. Id. § 2332h.
61. Id. § 2332d.
62. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (2000).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
64. Id. § 2332B.
65. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006).
66. McCormack, supra note 55, at 20.
67. See CTR. ON LAW & SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL: REPORT CARD: U.S. EDITION 3 (Karen J.
Greenberg et al. eds., 2006), available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/
TTRCComplete.pdf.
68. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses:
Conviction and Sentencing Data in Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and “Data-Reliability”
Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 879-88 (2007).
69. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
70. See, e.g., RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 81-90
(2008), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf;
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A key advantage of civilian criminal trials is the sense of
legitimacy they confer on U.S. treatment of terrorists and the
resulting facilitation of international cooperation. Some nations
take issue with American use of capital punishment,71 but virtually
all would agree that U.S. trials comply with human rights accords
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).72 The fact that more than 100 nations have extradition
treaties with the United States73 represents a significant vote of
confidence. And since terrorism-related treaties generally contain
explicit authorization for transfers between countries lacking a
dedicated extradition agreement,74 the United States theoretically
can get custody of terrorists from almost any nation when willing to
act within the bounds of criminal law.
Nevertheless, criminal prosecution cannot always provide
extended incapacitation of those affiliated with terrorism.
Fundamentally, criminal law imposes punishment upon offenders
for completed unlawful conduct, requiring more than mere danger-
ousness or evil intentions to establish liability to detention.
Reflecting the law’s retributive component, sentence length is tied
to the severity of the offense committed.75 Criminal law thus has
difficulty providing the basis for prolonged preventive detention of
persons who may desire to commit terrorist acts but who have not
yet engaged in substantive wrongdoing at the time of their capture. 
A second challenge, particularly in the post-9/11 environment, is
obtaining the requisite admissible evidence to support credible
convictions. In the first two Guantánamo military commission cases
completed, those of David Hicks and Salim Hamdan, the govern-
ment’s evidence consisted primarily of inculpatory statements made
by the accused in custody.76 Given detainee treatment that included
Kelly Anne Moore, Editorial, Take Al Qaeda to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21/opinion/21moore.html.
71. See, e.g., Sandra Babcock, The Global Debate on the Death Penalty, 34 HUM. RIGHTS
MAG. 17 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring07/babcospr07.html. 
72. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
73. U.S. extradition treaties are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2006), available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00003181----000-notes.html.
74. See, e.g., Convention on Internationally Protected Persons, supra note 52.
75. See James J. Bilsborrow, Note, Sentencing Acquitted Conduct to the Post-Booker
Dustbin, 49 WM.&MARYL.REV. 289, 302-04 (2007) (discussing federal sentencing guidelines).
76. Evidence against Hicks is discussed in his plea colloquy. Transcript of Record at 117-
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the use of highly coercive interrogation practices and prolonged
isolation, any such statements are likely to be inadmissible as
involuntary under federal criminal procedure standards.77 In the
seminal voluntariness case, Bram v. United States, merely remov-
ing the suspect’s clothes—tame treatment compared to many
Guantánamo interrogations78—was sufficient to bar admission of his
subsequent statement.79 In January 2009, the military commission
convening authority, Susan Crawford, revealed that she had refused
to approve criminal charges against the alleged twentieth 9/11
hijacker, Mohammed al Qahtani, because he had been subjected to
treatment amounting to torture in U.S. custody.80 Trying leading al
Qaeda figures like Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who was reportedly
subjected to repetitive waterboarding and serious threats made
against his family members,81 could place a federal judge in a real
dilemma. If such a case relied primarily on statements made by
detainees in custody, following the letter of U.S. law would likely
require a directed verdict of acquittal for lack of admissible
evidence. But judges would be seriously pressured to give juries the
chance to convict, incentivizing departures from criminal procedure
standards and rules of evidence. If such pressures prevailed, the
result could be long-term damage to the American legal system,
unlikely to be cabined to terrorist trials.82
21, United States v. Hicks, No. 04-0001 (Military Comm’n, Apr. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ commissionsHicks.html (follow “Record of Trial” hyperlink;
cites are to the Adobe Acrobat Reader pagination). For the evidence against Hamdan, see
Carol J. Williams, Hamdan Case Is Built On His Own Words, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at
A10, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-hamdan25-2008jul
25,3,354252.story.
77. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (holding that Petitioner’s will was
overborne by official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy falsely aroused; his confession was not
voluntary and its admission into evidence violated the Due Process Clause); Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding that a statement by the accused to a police officer that
evidently was not voluntary was inadmissable).
78. See MICHAEL RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANTANAMO: WHAT THE WORLD SHOULD KNOW
41-43 (2004).
79. 168 U.S. at 561-66.
80. William Glaberson, Detainee Was Tortured, A Bush Official Confirms, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2009, at A22.
81. CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O’CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE 30 (2007).
82. See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, Terror in the Courts: Beginning To Assess the Impact
of Terrorism-Related Prosecutions on Domestic Criminal Law and Procedure in the USA, 50
CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 25 (2008), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/
f84450541w77j984/fulltext.pdf.
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Federal trials are thus a credible option only for those detainees
who have engaged in actual serious criminal conduct and who can
be convicted without using statements made under coercive inter-
rogation. When practicable, however, regular civilian trials will
enjoy the greatest legitimacy and best facilitate international
cooperation in the fight against al Qaeda and therefore should be
the preferred option.
B. Terrorism as Piracy?
Some commentators have advocated past treatment of pirates as
a general model for dealing with contemporary terrorists.83 This
idea has appeal given some common characteristics of pirates and
terrorists. But proponents generally misunderstand the actual law
involved and fail to recognize that it ultimately invokes the
requirement for traditional criminal law employment. 
Pirates, like al Qaeda, are fundamentally nonstate actors in-
volved in criminal conduct, but are too powerful and geographically
remote to be countered by traditional law enforcement. Historically,
“wars” against pirates were largely the task of navies, sometimes
augmented by land forces when dealing with pirate colonies or
crews fleeing ashore to escape capture.84
There are other parallels between the history of piracy and
terrorism. Despite an oft-quoted Roman maxim that pirates are
“common enemies of mankind [hostes humani generis],”85 the reality
of piracy history was quite different through much of the post-
Renaissance era, if it was ever true.86 Between the sixteenth and
eighteenth centuries, states made substantial use of private armed
vessels, frequently, but far from always, legally cloaked as “priva-
teers” authorized to make captures on the high seas by government
commissions87 known as “letter[s] of marque and reprisal.”88 Nations
generally asserted the legitimacy of their own sea warriors while
83. See, e.g., Douglas R. Burgess Jr., The Dread Pirate Bin Laden, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug.
2005, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2005/feature_burgess_julaug05.msp. 
84. See generally PETER EARLE, THE PIRATE WARS (2003).
85. ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 17 (2d ed. 1998) (brackets in original).
86. See id. at 91-94.
87. See EARLE, supra note 84, at 21-23, 89-100, 211.
88. LINDLEY S. BUTLER, PIRATES, PRIVATEERS, & REBEL RAIDERS OF THE CAROLINA COAST
12 (2000).
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branding their adversaries as pirates; a label that the Spaniards
attached to British hero Sir Francis Drake89 and that the British
attached to America’s naval icon John Paul Jones.90 Even outright
pirates often enjoyed informal support from political figures.91
The infamous Atlantic pirate Edward Teach, better known as
Blackbeard, reportedly purchased the favor of North Carolina’s
colonial governor and chief justice.92 Teach was only taken when the
governor of neighboring Virginia exceeded his legal authority and
dispatched an expedition into Carolina waters.93 After he fought to
the death rather than surrender, Teach’s head was brought back to
Virginia for public display as a deterrent to other pirates.94
Proponents of treating terrorists as pirates inevitably focus on the
violent component of these efforts, implicitly wishing to see bin
Laden treated like Blackbeard. John Yoo, for example, has said:
Why is it so hard for people to understand that there is a
category of behavior not covered by the legal system? .... What
were pirates? ... What were slave traders? Historically, there
were people so bad that they were not given protection of the
laws. There were no specific provisions for their trial, or impris-
onment.95
Some indirect historical support can be found for these views.
Several sixteenth-century texts use language facially characterizing
pirates as outlaws,96 for example, and some modern authors have
pointed to a passage from a 1762 law dictionary as support for their
summary killing: “A Piracy attempted on the Ocean, if the Pirates
are overcome, the Takers may immediately inflict a Punishment by
hanging them up at the Main-yard End; though this is understood
89. EARLE, supra note 84, at 22.
90. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, JOHN PAUL JONES: A SAILOR’S BIOGRAPHY 214-18 (1959).
Jones, however, was actually a commissioned U.S. Navy officer and not a privateer.
91. See, e.g., EARLE, supra note 84, at 114-15. 
92. See BUTLER, supra note 88, at 39-42.
93. Id. at 43-44.
94. Id. at 44-46.
95. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106, 114
(quoting John Yoo). Yoo is not alone in this misconception. See, e.g., Jon M. Paladini,
Terrorism: War or Piracy?, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Feb. 2004, at 38, available at http://www.myazbar.org/
AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/0204WinnersTerror.pdf.
96. See RUBIN, supra note 85, at 28-41.
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where no legal judgement may be obtained.”97 A critical distinction,
however, is that this authority applied only to the exceptional case
of a civilian merchant vessel that managed to defeat an attack on
itself but could not safely detain captured pirates.98 It was a very
limited authorization based on strict necessity, inapplicable to those
pursuing pirates under governmental authority. The 1695 pirate-
hunting commission awarded to Captain William Kidd, who iron-
ically crossed the line and was hanged as a pirate himself, is
instructive in this regard:
[We] do hereby give and grant unto you the said captain William
Kidd ... full power and authority to apprehend, stop, and take
into your custody ... all such pirates ... which you shall meet ....
And if they will not submit without fighting, then you are by
force to compel them to yield. And we do also require you to
bring, or cause to be brought such pirates ... as you shall seize,
to a legal trial; to the end they may be proceeded against
according to law.99
The law was quite clear. Accused pirates and necessary witnesses
had to be shipped back to Britain for trial in Admiralty court until
1700, when Parliament authorized their trials abroad before seven-
member “commissions.”100 The statute provided explicit due process
guidelines, requiring commissioners to swear an oath that they
would “impartially try and adjudge the Prisoner” and that they had
no personal interest in the case, requiring all testimony to be in the
defendant’s presence, allowing cross-examination, and permitting
the production of defense witnesses.101 A royal official dispatched to
North America to brief colonial authorities on the implementation
of local trials stressed these formal requirements and made it clear
that under the law, any conviction as a pirate required either the
testimony of two witnesses or the accused’s confession.102 American
97. Jonathan M. Gutoff, The Law of Piracy in Popular Culture, 31 J. MAR. L. & COM. 643,
647 (2000); Bret Stephens, Why Don’t We Hang Pirates Anymore?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2008,
at A13. 
98. Stephens, supra note 97.
99. Commission to William Kidd (Jan. 26, 1695), in RUBIN, supra note 85, at 106.
100. EARLE, supra note 84, at 21-23; RUBIN, supra note 85, at 113.
101. The Piracy Act of 1700, 11 & 12 Will. 3, c.7, §§ 5, 6 (Eng.), reprinted in RUBIN, supra
note 85, at 401, 402.
102. Erwin C. Surrency, The Procedure for the Trial of a Pirate, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251,
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readers will recognize this as the same heightened standard of proof
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution for conviction of treason.103 This
300-year old law arguably provided accused pirates more rights
than the Guantánamo military commission rules do.104
In 1819, Congress adopted a terser statute than the British
prototype, authorizing “public armed vessels” to seize “piratical”
vessels and permitting the circuit courts to try those who have
committed “the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations,” on
the high seas, if they are “brought into or found in the United
States.”105 An 1820 amendment added additional text but kept the
basic provisions intact.106 The characterization of piracy in these
statutes remains in the U.S. Code today.107 Other 1820 language
criminalizing slave trafficking contradicts Yoo’s assertion that that
offense was also outside the law.108 Indeed, the first modern
international courts were created to deal with the disposition of
slave traffickers’ assets while the slavers themselves were prose-
cuted under national laws.109
The due process accorded pirates is highlighted in the 1834
Boston trial of the last major Atlantic pirate, Captain Don Pedro
Gibert of the slaver Panda, for robbing and attempting to burn the
American ship Mexican in 1832 with its crew locked below decks.110
Gibert was tried with eleven of his crew; Supreme Court Justice
252, 255 (1957).
103. See U.S CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
104. See David J. R. Frakt, An Indelicate Imbalance: A Critical Comparison of the Rules
and Procedures for Military Commissions and Courts-Martial, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315 (2007)
(comparing post-MCA commissions with courts-martial); Glazier, supra note 18, at 185-93
(critiquing the commissions as modified by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA));
David Glazier, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal: Judging the 21st Century Military
Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005, 2015-23, 2085-90 (2003) (critiquing the original post- 9/11
military commission process).
105. Piracy Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510, reprinted in RUBIN, supra note 85, at
411-12. Congress first proscribed piracy in confusing language in section 8 of a 1790 statute
establishing federal crimes. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112. The Supreme Court
interpreted these provisions in United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818), leading Congress
to clarify its intent in the 1819 act. See RUBIN, supra note 85, at 158. 
106. Piracy Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, 3 Stat. 600, reprinted in RUBIN, supra note 85, at
419-20 [hereinafter Piracy Act of 1820].
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
108. Piracy Act of 1820, supra note 106.
109. Jenny S. Martinez, Slave Trade on Trial, BOSTON REV., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 12,
available at http://bostonreview.net/BR32.5/martinez.php.
110. EARLE, supra note 84, at 237-38.
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Joseph Story presided in his role as a circuit judge.111 Because the
original purpose of the Panda’s voyage was slave trading and not
piracy, Story charged the jury that each defendant, other than the
captain and mate, who were responsible for any criminal acts
because of their command roles, must be proven to have actually
participated in overt acts onboard the Mexican.112 Ultimately, the
captain, mate, and five others were convicted; those acquitted
included the cabin boy, found to be too young at fifteen to be
culpable, and a slave cook, found to have had no free choice about
participating.113
Acts of terrorism, which are intended for political ends, cannot be
directly prosecuted under piracy statutes, which require a private
profit motive.114 Nevertheless, terrorism has enough in common
with piracy, including the trend towards universal jurisdiction, that
there is no obvious bar to patterning its legal treatment on that of
piracy. That is, military force could be sanctioned as a lawful means
to apprehend terrorists outside U.S. territory who would then be
subject to regular criminal laws governing detention and trial. This
approach was adopted in the U.S. expedition against Pancho Villa
early in the twentieth century.115
There are two practical difficulties that limit the overall utility of
this approach. The first is that it implicates all the challenges to
regular federal trials previously discussed, requiring a solid body of
admissible evidence to justify pretrial confinement and to secure
criminal convictions that will hold up on appeal. The U.S. Navy
reportedly turned captured Somali pirates over to Kenya for
prosecution in 2006 specifically to avoid having to undertake a
federal trial.116 The Navy released a second group outright despite
the pirates having fired upon U.S. personnel.117 In this case, the lack
111. See Sentence of the Pirates, BOSTON CENTINEL, Dec. 17, 1834, reprinted in N.H.
PATRIOT & STATE GAZETTE, Dec. 22, 1834, at 2.
112. See Judge Story’s Charge—Conviction of the Pirates, BOSTON EVENING GAZETTE,
reprinted in N.H. SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 1834, at 2. 
113. See id. at 3-4.
114. See Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals
About the Limits of the Alien Torts Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 142 (2004).
115. See STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 385-86 (2008).
116. Stephens, supra note 97. 
117. See Adriana Stuijt, Nine Somalian Piracy Suspects Released by US Navy, DIGITAL J.,
Mar. 3, 2009, http://digitaljournal.com/article/268439 (discussing the release of nine suspected
pirates after finding insufficient evidence to convict them).
2009] PLAYING BY THE RULES 977
of evidence satisfying required elements of the crime of piracy
precluded foreign trial, although the United States potentially could
have prosecuted them for assaulting federal officials.118
The second overarching limitation is that enforcement of piracy
laws is geographically constrained. By definition, the crime of piracy
can be committed only in international waters,119 but, more
critically, its enforcement is also so limited. Outside their own
territorial waters, nations can generally only deal with pirates
on “the high seas or [ ] any other place outside the jurisdiction of
any State.”120 The U.S. Navy’s international law manual informs
commanders that foreign territory is inviolable and that, within
territorial waters, authority to apprehend and try pirates belongs
exclusively to the coastal state.121 This limitation has been a real
factor historically. Lacking legal authority to pursue pirates ashore,
the British and American navies, for example, were unable to
effectively suppress Cuba-based pirates in the early nineteenth
century until Spain began to provide troops to round up those driven
ashore by naval actions.122 Due to the lack of an effective national
government in Somalia, the U.N. Security Council made a special
exception with respect to that country in 2008, authorizing the
pursuit of pirates into Somalian waters.123 But, absent the same
level of international support, the territorial issue would be a
particular show stopper to U.S. efforts to capture modern terrorists,
who are virtually all land-based. Use of the military in foreign
territory without explicit legal sanction from either the U.N.
Security Council or the nation whose territory would be violated
would constitute a hostile belligerent act.124 Indeed, a largely
forgotten aspect of the Pancho Villa expedition is that it ultimately
118. Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for
Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1, 4 n.3, 17 (2007). The U.S. could
have tried them for assault on a federal officer but elected not to do so.
119. Piracy is now defined in article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Oct. 12, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
120. See id. art. 100.
121. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
ch. 3, at 3-6 (2007).
122. EARLE, supra note 84, at 238-47.
123. S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 10(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008). 
124. Grayson Kirtz, The Enforcement of Security, 55 YALE L.J. 1081, 1093 (1945-1946).
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brought U.S. troops into direct combat against Mexican national
forces, nearly precipitating outright war between the two nations.125
Despite its romantic appeal, the piracy paradigm appears to be of
limited legal advantage as a tool in the fight against terrorists. It
does, however, highlight the fact that there is no obvious bar to
criminal prosecution of persons that the military captures outside
the United States in settings that the law of war does not explicitly
regulate. That body of law places specific limits on the trial of those
captured in an actual armed conflict in accordance with rules
discussed in Parts III and IV.
C. Terrorism Under the Law of War
The law of war does offer authority that can be employed to
advantage in the fight against those terrorists whose activity rises
to the level of an “armed conflict.” Most obviously, an “enemy” may
be attacked with lethal force with no obligation to give prior
warning.126 Good faith offers of surrender must be accepted, but
soldiers, unlike policemen, need not ask for surrender before
shooting.127 Provided noncombatants are not the direct object of
attack, the enemy may be engaged even when likely to result in
civilian casualties so long as they are not “disproportionate” to the
military advantage to be gained.128 Invocation of this paradigm also
authorizes a liberal preventative detention regime and the authority
to subject adversaries violating law of war provisions to military
trials. Detainees famously need give only “name, rank, and serial
number,”129 but there are no explicit limits on the length or subject
of interrogation or any requirement for access to counsel as there
would be with criminal detention.130
Given the significant challenges posed applying criminal law to
a geographically remote—and frequently fanatical—enemy like al
125. Joe Griffith, In Pursuit of Pancho Villa 1916-1917, http://www.hsgng.org/pages/
pancho.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
126. See DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 27.
127. Id. at 145.
128. Id. at 13, 119-20.
129. This is the popular formulation; date of birth is also included in the treaty. Geneva III,
supra note 26, art. 17.
130. See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 8.34
(2004).
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Qaeda, there is obvious advantage to at least selective law of war
employment as tools in the fight. The real problem with the Bush
administration’s approach was not the choice of the war paradigm,
but rather treatment of war as a regime in which “the gloves came
off ”131 and legal constraints on U.S. action were ignored. 
The idea that war frees a nation from legal constraints is far from
new. Grotius observed almost four centuries ago: “That war is
irreconcilable with all law is a view held not alone by the ignorant
populace; expressions are often let slip by well-informed and
thoughtful men which lend countenance to such a view. Nothing is
more common than the assertion of antagonism between law and
arms.”132
But even the most cursory study of the law of war quickly reveals
the fallacy of this view. Virtually every society that has left a
written record has documented legal constraints on the conduct
of hostilities.133 The law of war constitutes a major portion of
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century international law treatises.134
The explosive growth of international law in the twentieth century,
including the proliferation of multinational organizations and
international courts, as well as the development of such new fields
as international environmental and human rights law, relegated the
law of war to relative obscurity. Today, it typically occupies just a
single chapter in an international law text.135 This is ironic given the
equally expansive development of the law of war during this same
era136 but may explain why expertise on this subject seems so
limited among policymakers.
131. MAYER, supra note 4, at 39-41 (describing the CIA’s initial leading role).
132. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 206.
133. See A. P. V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 1 (1996).
134. See, e.g., EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore
eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (dedicating one of four “books” to “war”). The law of war takes up
two-thirds of Henry Halleck’s 1861 treatise. H. W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: OR, RULES
REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 311-892 (D. Van Nostrand 1861).
135. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1054-81 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing
“International Humanitarian Law” or jus in bello in a single twenty-eight page chapter in a
1200 page text). 
136. The ICRC’s website compiles 102 treaties and documents central to the development
of international humanitarian law—which is also termed as the law of war. See ICRC,
International Humanitarian Law—Treaties & Documents, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
INTRO?OpenView (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). Eighty-eight of these treaties and documents
date after 1900. Id.
980 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:957
1. Practical Roots of the Law of War 
Most modern commentators view the law governing armed
conflict as primarily humanitarian, assuming it is the product of
lawyers and organizations such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC).137 Indeed, many academics and humanitari-
ans use International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as a synonym for
the law of war138 rather than in its traditional sense as a subset of
that corpus juris.139 The reality is that the law of war reflects a great
degree of pragmatism, striking a balance between humanitarian
concerns and military necessity,140 and warriors contributed
substantially to its formulation.141
As early as the Revolutionary War, Americans assumed leading
roles in law of war adherence and development, recognizing
practical and political advantages from U.S. compliance. George
Washington insisted on better treatment for captured British, and
particularly Hessian, personnel than Americans received, both to
incentivize surrender and to secure broad political support for the
U.S. cause.142 Predating the Constitution, the 1785 Treaty of Amity
and Commerce with Prussia incorporated rules for the treatment of
prisoners that were far ahead of their time.143 Article 24 requires
that prisoners:
[s]hall be placed in ... wholesome situations; [ ] they shall not be
confined in dungeons, prison-ships, nor prisons, nor be put into
irons, nor bound, nor otherwise restrained in the use of their
limbs; that the officers shall be enlarged on their paroles within
convenient districts, and have comfortable quarters, and the
137. DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 6 (2006).
138. Even the ICRC, the international champion of humanitarian law, now defines IHL as
synonymous with the law of war. Fact Sheet, ICRC, What is International Humanitarian
Law? (July 31, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/humanitarian-law-
factsheet/$File/What_is_IHL.pdf.
139. See GÉZA HERCZEGH, DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 56-57
(1984).
140. DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 13, 16-20.
141. David Glazier, Ignorance is Not Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation and the U.S.
Invasion of Iraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 121, 129-32 (2005). 
142. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, WASHINGTON’S CROSSING 375-79 (2004).
143. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Pruss., art. xxiv, July 9-Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat.
84, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/prus1785.asp. 
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common men be disposed in cantonments, open and extensive
enough for air and exercise, and lodged in barracks as roomy
and good as are provided by the party in whose power they are
for their own troops.144
The rest of the world took over a century to catch up. These rules
are consistent with provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of
1949, considered to have achieved universal status with 194 state
ratifications.145
U.S. military leaders were responsible for other law of war
advances as well. General Winfield Scott realized the critical
importance of Mexican acquiescence to the American presence in
their country during the Mexican War.146 Measures he implemented
to ensure the success of his mission were subsequently codified as
the basis of what became the “laws of belligerent occupation.”147 The
first effort to capture the customary law of war in a form suitable for
guiding military conduct in the field was the “Lieber Code,”148
authored by Columbia professor Francis Lieber under sponsorship
of the Army’s General in Chief, Henry Halleck.149 Issued to the
Union Army under cover of General Order No. 100 in April 1863,
this seminal effort formed the basis of the next half-century of law
of war development, culminating in the Hague Land Warfare
Regulations, which remain valid law today.150
Faithful adherence to international law regulating both the resort
to and conduct of war remained a hallmark of U.S. policy through
the twentieth century. Despite a few egregious violations such as
My Lai, U.S. policy was to comply with formal law of war require-
ments during the Vietnam conflict even when it meant refraining
from striking otherwise lawful targets or increasing the risk to U.S.
144. Id.
145. See Official Statement, ICRC, A Milestone for International Humanitarian Law (Sept.
22, 2006), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/geneva-conventions-statement-220
906.
146. Glazier, supra note 141, at 140.
147. See id. at 139-46. 
148. FRANCIS LIEBER, U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES
OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (1863), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/
110?OpenDocument [hereinafter LIEBER CODE].
149. Glazier, supra note 141, at 129, 151-60.
150. Id. at 129-33. Violation of key Hague articles is explicitly criminalized in the War
Crimes Act of 1996. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2) (2006).  
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personnel.151 President George H. W. Bush sought explicit U.N.
authorization for launching the first Gulf War,152 and law of war
compliance was emphasized during all aspects of military opera-
tions.153 These measures were important elements in maintaining
world public support for the war and the cohesion of the broad
coalition of participating forces.154
It is only post-9/11 that U.S. leaders have consciously advocated
a policy seeking to narrow the scope of, or even except the United
States from following, law of war provisions governing conduct of an
armed conflict.155 Legal analyses and presidential declarations
seeking to place the Taliban and al Qaeda outside law of war
protections156 are unprecedented in U.S. history.157
2. War as a Protector of Civil Liberties
Terrorist threats pose a fundamental dilemma for modern
governments. The U.N. Secretary General’s High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change recognized the protection of
innocent citizens as a core governmental responsibility.158 But
practical difficulties in preventing and prosecuting terrorist acts
have led some governments to accept departures from ordinary
criminal procedure and fundamental rights. Examples include
extended detention without charges or based on lower standards of
evidence, “enhanced” interrogations, and special courts for trying
151. See W. Hays Parks, Linebacker and the Law of War, AIR U. REV. (1983), available at
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jan-feb/parks.html.
152. Comm. on Int’l Sec. Affairs of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Legality and
Constitutionality of the President’s Authority To Initiate an Invasion of Iraq, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 15, 23-24 (2002).
153. Christopher Greenwood, Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol
of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW
63, 63-64 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993).
154. Adam Roberts, Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War, SURVIVAL,
Spring 2002, at 7, 14.
155. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM 2-5 (2008). 
156. See, e.g., [Draft] Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., for
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.
slate.com/features/whatistorture/pdfs/020109.pdf.
157. James B. Staab, The War on Terror’s Impact on Habeas Corpus: The Constitutionality
of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 2008 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 280, 285 n.24.
158. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES, AND CHANGE, A MORE SECURE WORLD:
OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, Executive Summary 4 (2004).
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terrorists.159 Russia is currently rolling back the recently renewed
right to jury trials for suspected terrorists.160 Fundamentally, these
policies are based on expediency rather than any principled
grounds, raising the quandary of how these precedents are to be
cabined if determined to be legal with respect to terrorists. The U.S.
government has engaged in a metaphorical “war on drugs” for
several decades, including limited use of military forces in support
of law enforcement.161 What would prevent the President and
Congress, acting together, from deciding that this threat now
required warrantless offshore detention of suspected traffickers,
exemption from Fifth Amendment protections, and trial by special
tribunals offering less due process than Article III courts? This
approach risks starting down a slippery slope in which established
constitutional criminal procedure protections could be denied to an
expanding set of groups deemed to pose special dangers to the public
welfare.
A principle advantage of the war paradigm is that it is self-
limiting. There are formal legal prerequisites under both domestic
and international law for its lawful invocation. Domestically, the
Framers were careful to divide the King’s war powers between the
President and Congress. The President as Commander in Chief can
direct the conduct of hostilities as “first general and first admiral”162
and can take immediate action to defend the United States.163 The
President may well have the authority to conduct a limited strike
justified as an urgent response to a terrorist attack, for example.
But the power to commit the United States to an extended conflict,
and to authorize incidental measures permitted by the law of war
such as preventive detention, was entrusted to Congress, which has
among its enumerated powers the power “[t]o declare War ... and to
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”164
159. See Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and
U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 58 (2007).
160. Agence France-Presse, Russia: Jury Trials Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008,
at A8.
161. See Maj. Darren C. Huskinsson, The Air Bridge Denial Program and the Shootdown
of Civil Aircraft Under International Law, 56 A.F. L. REV. 109, 112 (2005).
162. David Luban, On The Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L REV. 477, 483 (2008).
163. See id. at 568.
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Formal declarations of war have been rare. Congress has enacted
a total of eleven such declarations in just five wars: the War of 1812,
the Mexican War (1846), the Spanish-American War (1898), World
War I (1917) (WWI), and World War II (1941-42) (WWII).165 Many
commentators think they are now a thing of the past.166 But Michael
Ramsey persuasively argues that the Constitution’s use of “declare
war” should be read to confer on Congress the power to authorize
actions that create a state of war, not merely to issue a formalistic
“proclamation.”167 Congress has specifically authorized recent
conflicts through joint resolutions generally agreed as satisfying the
constitutional requirement.168
The Constitution imposes no explicit limits on when Congress can
authorize war, but we would surely agree that it could not, say,
declare a “war on illiteracy” authorizing the military to bomb poorly
performing schools or shoot their teachers. Other constitutional
provisions, such as the Fifth Amendment protection of life and
property, presumably would bar the declaration of war against
domestic entities, whereas political processes would check the most
egregious abuses abroad. Decisions to go to war almost reflexively
follow actual attacks like Pearl Harbor and 9/11, but there has been
serious debate in “optional” cases such as the two Iraq wars. One
hopes Congress ultimately would fail to authorize the expansive
application of “war” as a legal regime to criminal organizations such
as drug cartels or even terrorist groups lacking the robust military
capacities of al Qaeda. 
This does not mean that courts should be powerless to check
excesses. Logically, the definition of war and the rules for its
commencement found in international law should be considered to
have been implicitly incorporated in the constitutional language.
165. War was declared separately on Germany and Austria-Hungary in WWI and against
Japan, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania in WWII. JENNIFER K. ELSEA &
RICHARD F. GRIMMET, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND
AUTHORIZATIONS FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE 2-3 (2007).
166. See generally Naval Historical Center, Instances of Use of the United States Forces
Abroad, 1798-1993, http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm (last visited Nov. 22,
2009).
167. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 237-38 (2007).
168. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2057 (2005). The Congressional Research Service
believes there are differences between a declaration of war and authorizations for use of force
in their domestic law implications. See ELSEA & GRIMMET, supra note 165, at 28-29. 
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Resort to “war” thus should be limited by these legal constraints as
well. While Part II.B. will conclude that wars can be fought against
nonstate actors, they still are limited to politically motivated
conflicts between defined armed groups. 
After more than a century of substantial legal developments,
international rules regulating the resort to war, or jus ad bellum,
now impose significant constraints on the ability of states to embark
in armed conflict. War was considered a lawful sovereign right of
states until the early twentieth century,169 but that view is now
obsolete. Parties to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact agreed to “con-
demn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,
and renounce it as an instrument of national policy.”170 The
Nuremberg Judgment, subsequently ratified by the United Nations
General Assembly,171 affirmed that this made war “illegal in
international law” and that those launching an aggressive war
“commit[ ] a crime in so doing.”172 Today, Articles 2(3)-(4) and 51 of
the 1945 United Nations Charter explicitly limit use of force to cases
of self-defense.173 After the recent Iraq War, U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan assembled an international blue-ribbon panel to
consider, inter alia, how literally Article 51, confirming the right of
self-defense against an armed attack, was to be construed. Its report
concluded that it preserved the previously extant right of self
defense against imminent threats.174 It repudiated President Bush’s
broader preemptive war doctrine,175 recognizing only the narrow
right to respond to truly immediate threats outlined in correspon-
dence between U.S. and British officials following the 1837 Caroline
incident.176 As articulated by Daniel Webster, anticipatory use of
169. See JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
38-39 (2004).
170. Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation
of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/kbpact/kbpact.htm.
171. G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
172. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 462 (1948).
173. U.N. Charter arts. 2(3)-(4), 51.
174. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 at 54-55 (Dec. 2, 2004).
175. Compare id., with THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15-16 (2002). 
176. Louis-Philippe Rouillard, The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-Defence in
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force requires a “necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”177
Today, nations thus are entitled to invoke the law of war’s
authority in self-defense only following an actual attack or the rare
situation meeting the Caroline imminency requirements. These
limitations highlight how the war paradigm can be more readily
cabined than proposed alternatives. The U.N. Security Council
specifically cited the United States’s right of self-defense after
9/11,178 and NATO determined that it constituted an armed attack
on a member—the only one in the alliance’s sixty-year history.179
These organizations will not endorse a military response to less
robust threats, providing a potential check on inappropriate resort
to the war paradigm.
The war paradigm offers another unique advantage; abuse of the
authority it provides may constitute war crimes prosecutable under
domestic180 and international law.181 Even though there have been
few U.S. war crimes prosecutions since WWII, this liability never-
theless can have an actual deterrent effect, evidenced by both the
growing numbers of international prosecutions and the efforts of
Bush administration lawyers to try to place U.S. actions outside the
scope of law of war coverage.182
Since the law of war might be applied in responding to the 9/11
perpetrators’ attack, the larger challenge is determining both what
it permits and what constraints it should impose on U.S. conduct.
The first step is to define the nature and scope of the conflict.
Contemporary International Law, 1 MISKOLC J. INT’L L. 104 (2004); see also infra note 199 and
accompanying text.
177. Letter from Daniel Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), quoted in Rouillard, supra note
176.
178. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (referencing the inherent right
of self-defense); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (same).
179. See Robertson, supra note 20.
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) (codifying the War Crimes Act of 1996).
181. See generally KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2001)
(discussing conduct proscribed under the law of war).
182. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 12.
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II. DEFINING AND CHARACTERIZING THE WAR
A. Defining the Conflict
Any serious effort to apply the law of war logically begins by
identifying the parties involved because this law focuses on defining
their rights and responsibilities.183 Only then can rational discus-
sions occur about who can lawfully be subject to targeting, capture,
detention, and military trial. 
The precise identity of the opponents has frequently been clouded
in the “war on terror.” President Bush termed the commencement
of combat in Afghanistan as “part of our campaign against terror-
ism.”184 In March 2002, he spoke of fighting “terror networks of
global reach.”185 By September of that year he had adopted the “war
on terror” terminology and sought to incorporate Iraq within its
ambit.186 The Bush administration subsequently endeavored to
treat the legally distinct conflicts against Iraq and al Qaeda as a
single “war.” The official White House website, for example, head-
lined presidential speeches on Iraq as “[discussions on the] Global
War on Terror”187 and requests for supplemental appropriations for
Afghanistan and Iraq were jointly requested for “the global war.”188
Ultimately, of course, it is not the political rhetoric, but rather the
legal definition of the conflict that matters. The “war on terror”
nomenclature was simply nonsensical. Terrorism is a means of
warfare, not a political entity against which a conflict can be
contested. The Obama administration reportedly decided in March
2009 to use the vague euphemism “overseas contingency operations”
183. See Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of U.S. Practice Relating to “Enemy Combatants,” 10
Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 232, 238 (2007).
184. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Combat Action in Afghanistan Against
Al Qaida Terrorists and Their Taliban Supporters, 2 PUB.PAPERS 1211,1211-12 (Oct. 9, 2001).
185. Remarks on the Six-Month Anniversary of the September 11th Attacks, 1 PUB.PAPERS
374, 376 (Mar. 11, 2002).
186. Remarks by President Bush and President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia in Photo
Opportunity, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1656, 1657 (Sept. 25, 2002).
187. The White House, President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror (Mar. 19, 2008),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080319-2.html.
188. The White House, President Requests $72.4 Billion for the Global War on Terror (Feb.
16, 2006), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060216-11.
html.
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instead of “war on terror,”189 but this phrase ultimately could be
even worse, allowing essentially any extraterritorial military
activity to be included in its ambit.
The Framers entrusted the authority to define the nation’s
conflicts to Congress as the power to “declare war,” and Congress
has defined the enemy in this conflict. The AUMF, enacted on
September 18, 2001, limited the scope of the war to “those nations,
organizations, or persons [who] ... planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,”
or harbored those who did.190 President Bush carefully stopped just
short of claiming Iraq fell within the AUMF’s scope even though his
administration wanted to link Saddam Hussein to 9/11 and obtained
separate congressional authorization for the 2003 invasion.191 It is
now well established that al Qaeda was the “organization” responsi-
ble for the 9/11 attacks while Afghanistan’s Taliban harbored them,
making these two groups the legitimate adversaries.192 The “War
Against al Qaeda and the Taliban” (WAQT) is thus a much more apt
description of the conflict than the “war on terror.” The latter term
was particularly disadvantageous because it allowed other nations
to link their own, often heavy-handed, efforts to suppress indige-
nous resistance movements with the U.S. conflict, cloaking their
actions with a claim of legitimacy, and implying an alliance in a
common fight.193
Faithful adherence to international law also results in a narrow
definition of the conflict. Given the U.N. Charter’s strict restriction
on the use of force to self-defense, conflict must be implicitly limited
to fighting one’s attacker as well as any direct allies who take its
side. International law thus should impose the same limits on the
post-9/11 conflict as the AUMF does, limiting the adversaries to al
Qaeda and the Taliban.
189. Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name, WASH. POST,
Mar. 25, 2009, at A4.
190. AUMF, supra note 20.
191. Glazier, supra note 27, at 62-63.
192. Id. at 63.
193. See generally Benn Criticises ‘War on Terror,’ BBC NEWS, Apr. 16, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6558569.stm.
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B. War Against a Nonstate Actor?
Defining the conflict as the WAQT raises the question of whether
a nation, the United States, can legally wage war against a nonstate
actor, al Qaeda.194 Up through at least the middle of the eighteenth
century the answer would seem to have been a fairly clear “no.”
Emer de Vattel’s 1758 classic, The Law of Nations, declared that
“the sovereign power alone is possessed of authority to make war.”195
Five years later Jean Jacques Rousseau was equally explicit,
declaring “each State can have only other States, and not men, as
enemies since no true relationship can be established between
things of different natures.”196 Nevertheless, the American colonials
expected the law of war to apply to their conflict against Great
Britain.197 The Supreme Court held the law of war applicable to
hostilities between the self-proclaimed Venezuelan Republic and
Spain in 1820 although the U.S. government had not recognized
Venezuelan independence.198 The Caroline incident, which resulted
in the establishment of modern rules concerning the right of self-
defense, involved conflict between Britain and private citizens.199
And the United States made the seminal contribution to modern law
of war development, the Lieber Code, in a civil war against an
enemy that it denied had any legal status.200 Nevertheless, the
Union employed belligerent measures taken from the international
law of war in the conflict, including the blockade of Confederate
ports, which it enforced against ships from all nations. These
developments may not seem revolutionary given that most of these
adversaries self-identified as nations and arguably could meet
194. It should not matter whether the Taliban was an actual state in 2001. If it was, there
is no doubt as to its qualification as a conflict party; if it was not, the same logic applicable to
al Qaeda should apply. 
195. VATTEL, supra note 134, at 471.
196. 4 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Social Contract, in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF
ROUSSEAU 128, 136 (Roger D. Masters & Christopher Kelly eds., Judith R. Bush et al. trans.,
University Press of New England 1994).
197. FISCHER, supra note 142, at 377.
198. The Josefa Segunda, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 338, 357-58 (1820).
199. NEFF, supra note 115, at 389.
200. Glazier, supra note 141, at 147, 151-53.
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statehood criteria,201 but they reveal a clear trend toward recogni-
tion of nonstates as belligerents.202
By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States had
fought wars against Indian tribes and Philippine insurrectionists
despite refusing them full sovereign recognition.203 The latter
conflict also made significant, albeit little known, contributions to
law of war development, including war crimes trials under the
theory of command responsibility.204 The trend toward treating
nonstate actors as conflict parties expanded in the twentieth
century. By the 1970s, the U.N. General Assembly decided that
“national liberation movements” were entitled to status as
belligerents in international armed conflicts.205 This concept was
codified in the 1977 Additional Geneva Protocol I.206 Although the
United States is not a party to the Protocol, 168 other nations are,
indicating its wide acceptance.207
The evolution of the law of war to incorporate nonstate actors
within the realm of belligerents is fully consistent with overall
trends in international law. States were its only recognized subjects
in the nineteenth century. But in the twentieth century, interna-
tional law expanded to give formal legal status to intergovernmental
organizations, regulate states’ treatment of their own nationals, and
impose individual criminal liability for an expanding set of viola-
tions.208 A nonstate group, particularly one controlling no actual
territory, may not always be entitled to demand treatment as a
belligerent, but nothing should prevent a state fighting against a
201. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (2005) (identifying
statehood criteria as “(a) a permanent population; (b) defined territory; (c) a government; and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other states”).
202. Eibe H. Riedel, Recognition of Belligerency, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 167, 168 (1982). 
203. See, e.g., Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military
Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV 13, 13-14 (1990). 
204. See David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission,
46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 52 (2005). 
205. G.A. Res. 3103 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3103 (Dec. 12, 1973).
206. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 438
[hereinafter Protocol I].
207. See ICRC, supra note 136.
208. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 201, at 198-99, 233-36, 268-72.
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nonstate opponent from choosing to recognize their adversary as a
belligerent and invoking the law of war in the conflict.209
C. Characterization of the Conflict
Assuming that the United States can engage in a war against al
Qaeda, it is necessary to characterize the conflict in terms that
identify the set of law of war rules that apply. Traditionally,
conflicts have been bifurcated as either “international” or “non-
international.” The former were contested between nation states,
whereas the latter term applied to conflicts between a government
and internal opposition within its own territory, for example, a civil
war. In the days when international law addressed only sovereign
states, nations were on sound ground resisting the imposition of
external regulation to these internal conflicts. Nations steadfastly
reserved the right to treat internal opponents as common criminals
to be dealt with strictly as a matter of domestic law.210 As a result,
international law has never defined opposition participants in these
conflicts as “combatants” or “prisoners of war” and contains no
authority for detention of captured fighters. This is left entirely to
domestic law. The United States has taken two different tacks in
past conflicts that international law would have allowed it to
characterize as “noninternational,” choosing either to treat the
adversaries under existing criminal law, as it did in the Whiskey
Rebellion, or adopting international belligerency rules, as it
ultimately did during the Civil War.211 U.S. law thus contains no
explicit provisions governing detention in noninternational conflict.
As international law expanded to provide more protections for
noncombatants, humanitarians concluded that similar measures
would be equally valuable in internal conflicts, and the ICRC sought
to encourage steps in this direction in the early twentieth century.212
It was only after World War II, however, when the Nuremberg
judgment, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
1948 Genocide Convention explicitly extended the reach of interna-
209. See GREEN, supra note 30, at 318.
210. See, e.g., ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 65, 69 (2008).
211. BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, ACT OF JUSTICE 41-42, 61 (2007).
212. Id. at 21-22.
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tional law into internal state conduct, that significant headway was
made in this realm.213 Common Article 2 (CA2)214 of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 facially limits the applicability of the full
treaties to “armed conflict which may arise between two or more of
the High Contracting Parties.”215 Although the ICRC wanted the
conventions to apply to internal conflicts, the Diplomatic Conference
compromised by drafting a stand-alone article providing a limited
set of protections.216 The resulting Common Article 3 (CA3) applies
only to “armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”217 Highly
abbreviated compared to the full conventions, it gives several basic
protections to those “taking no active part in the hostilities,” in-
cluding fighters who have surrendered or otherwise been rendered
“hors de combat” (for example, incapacitated by wounds or sick-
ness).218 These include a generic requirement for “humane” treat-
ment and express prohibitions against further violence, degrading
treatment, or trials lacking fundamental judicial guarantees.219
These protections were further expanded and more specifically
enumerated in the second Additional Geneva Protocol of 1977.220
President Reagan submitted this treaty for Senate approval in
1987,221 where U.S. action is still pending.222 It has been ratified by
164 other nations in the interim.223
213. GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 290-301 (1980).
214. The first three articles of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions are identical and thus are
commonly referred to as “Common Articles” 1, 2, and 3. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The Cost
of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary
Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 65 (2009).
215. Geneva I, supra note 26, art. 2; Geneva II, supra note 26, art. 2; Geneva III, supra note
26, art. 2; Geneva IV, supra note 26, art. 2.
216. LINDSEY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 23-29 (2002).
217. Geneva I, supra note 26, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 26, art. 3; Geneva III, supra note
26, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 26, art. 3.
218. See supra note 217.
219. See supra note 217.
220. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts arts. 1, 4, 5, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609-17 [hereinafter Protocol II].
221. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to the U.S. Senate, Jan. 29, 1987, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 100-2 (1987).
222. U.S. Department of State, Treaties Pending in the Senate, http://www.state.gov/
s/l/treaty/pending (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
223. ICRC, supra note 136.
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The Supreme Court deferred decision about whether the full
Conventions apply to Guantánamo detainees in its 2006 Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld decision but held that, at minimum, CA3 would.224 The
Court reasoned that conflict with the nonstate affiliated al Qaeda
was literally “noninternational,” that is, not between nations.225
Although linguistically appealing, this ignores CA3's explicit
language requiring a qualifying conflict to occur within the territory
of one state.226 The Court also ignored two basic considerations
implicit in the logic for limiting the application of international law
to internal conflicts. First, internal combatants violate a duty of
loyalty to the state they are fighting. Second, they will get the
procedural due process provided by the country’s domestic legal
system when prosecuted as ordinary criminals. Today, protections
accorded by national legal systems must comport with human rights
mandates, most commonly the ICCPR,227 which has 162 state
parties, including the United States.228
The WAQT, however, is not confined to any single state, and only
two detainees held during the conflict, Jose Padilla and Ali al-Marri,
were captured on American soil.229 Since 9/11, the United States has
used military force against al Qaeda at least in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Yemen,230 exercised belligerent rights of visit and
search on the high seas,231 and detained and tried captured enemies
in Guantánamo, Cuba.232 Al Qaeda’s membership also transcends
nationality, described by one scholar as “an assemblage of Moslem
fanatics from all parts of the world.”233 Few of these individuals
224. 548 U.S. 557, 629-31 (2004).
225. Id. at 628-30.
226. See, e.g., Geneva I, supra note 26, art. 3.
227. ICCPR, supra note 72.
228. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, July 22, 2008, 99 U.N.T.S. 171, available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/ Publication/MTDSG/Volume I/Chapter IV/IV-4.en.pdf.
229. Emily Bazelon, Here We Go Again, SLATE, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/
12793/.
230. See, e.g., Record of Achievement, Waging and Winning the War on Terror,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/achievement/chap1.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2009).
231. Cf. Lt. Col. Andrew S. Williams, The Interception of Civil Aircraft over the High Seas
in the Global War on Terror, 59 A.F. L. REV. 73, 116 (2007) (explaining the legal justification
for such exercises).
232. SANDS, supra note 5, at 144.
233. DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 49.
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could be said to owe any loyalty to the United States. The United
States also denies the applicability of normal criminal procedure,
holding detainees subject to military commissions deliberately
chosen to avoid the formal due process protections of regular civilian
courts, or even those of courts-martial.234 The United States also
asserts that ICCPR mandates do not extend beyond national
boundaries, denying its applicability to Guantánamo.235 Treating
the WAQT as “noninternational” thus defies logic. Adopting this
approach requires asserting that international law gives a nation
the right to dispatch military force into the sovereign territory of
another state, kill or capture members of a nonstate group who are
not citizens of the capturing power, and remove them to territory
under its control where it may detain and try them under whatever
laws it chooses to enact for this purpose with essentially no greater
legal obligation other than to treat them “humanely.” After more
than a half-century of extensive development of both international
humanitarian and international human rights law, it simply strains
credibility to make such a claim.
Semantically, the most apt description for the conflict with al
Qaeda would be a “transnational” conflict because the adversary
consists of individuals of diverse nationalities while the conflict
locus transcends national borders. This term has the additional
advantage of implicitly highlighting that the full Geneva Conven-
tions may not be expressly applicable under the language of CA2.
Since the term “transnational conflict” is not yet legally recognized,
there is no explicit international agreement on the specific rules
that would govern. If the choice is between the rules governing
“international” and “noninternational” conflict, then the former
clearly seems the better alternative. Even if many law of war
treaties might not facially apply to such a conflict, per the Martens
Clause “the principles of the law of nations, as they result from
the usages established among civilized peoples,”236 for example,
customary international law of war rules, should apply. It would be
perverse to assert that international law had evolved to permit
nonstate entities to be the subject of a war yet did not extend its
234. SANDS, supra note 5, at 144, 146.
235. Id. at 145.
236. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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rules regulating conflict to such a war, particularly given the law’s
concurrent extension to both nonstate organizations and the pro-
tection of individual human rights. Regardless of how the WAQT is
ultimately termed, the customary law of war as it has evolved from
the Lieber Code through the present day should govern. 
Although the Geneva Conventions may not apply to the WAQT as
treaty law, their universal ratification may argue for finding that
most convention provisions are now customary law.237 The ICRC
completed an extensive study of customary law of war rules in
2005.238 Because of the Conventions’ wide ratification, the study
focused on rules contained in less widely accepted accords.239 It did
conclude, however, that “the great majority of the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 3, are considered
to be part of customary international law.”240 Judges of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have gone
further, holding that the full texts of the 1949 Conventions are now
fully incorporated into customary law.241 
Most of the 1977 Additional Geneva Protocols should also now
have customary law status. The United States has refused to
ratify Protocol I but considers many of its provisions to be custom-
ary law.242 For example, the Bush administration’s first State
Department Legal Advisor, William H. Taft, IV, confirmed that the
United States accepts the core protections contained in Protocol I’s
Article 75 as customary law,243 a view shared almost universally
by scholars.244 These views are shared by the ICRC study, which
237. But see Theodore Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L
L. 348, 367 (1987) (noting the difficulty in establishing the requisite opinio juris that
Convention provisions have assumed customary law status when almost all states are
obligated to follow them as a matter of treaty law).
238. See generally JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005). 
239. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 87
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 187 (2005).
240. Id.
241. KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 181, at 139.
242. See, e.g., Memorandum of the Department of Defense Law of War Working Group
(May 8, 1986) (on file with author); Michael Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State,
Speech at American University (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AM. U.J. INT’L L & POL’Y 419, 420 (1987).
243. William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28
YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 321-22 (2003).
244. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 32; Roberts, supra note 154, at 16.
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concluded that “the basic principles of Additional Protocol I have
been very widely accepted, more widely than the ratification record
... would suggest.”245 Even if the application of the full scope of IHL
to the WAQT is not mandatory, there should be no grounds for other
nations to object to the United States electing to do so as long as it
does so in a consistent manner. This has effectively been the
approach adopted by the U.S. military for several decades, and the
military has never encountered any international objection.246 The
United States thus should be free to select appropriate measures
from the full scope of permissible courses of action under the law of
war but should also be subject to virtually all the constraints it
imposes.
III. CLASSIFYING THE ENEMY IN THE “WAR ON TERROR”
The most controversial aspect of U.S. conduct in the “war on
terror” to date has been the treatment of detainees. Drawing on
arguably misconstrued precedent,247 until early 2009 the United
States classified detainees as “enemy combatants”—a term Depart-
ment of Defense officials coined in 2002,248 which lacks understood
meaning under the law of war—and treated them as falling outside
any recognized protective regime.249 In February 2002, President
Bush accepted the Department of Justice’s view that neither al
Qaeda nor the Taliban qualified for protection under the Geneva
Conventions but ambiguously declared that:
Our values as a Nation ... call for us to treat detainees hu-
manely, including those who are not legally entitled to such
245. Henckaerts, supra note 239, at 187; see also Roberts, supra note 154, at 16.
246. See, e.g., JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
81 (2006) (describing the U.S. history of liberal application of the Geneva Conventions to past
conflicts). 
247. Most accounts cite Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), as a conceptual foundation for
the existence of “unlawful combatants” as a distinct category. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note
28, at 30; see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 64-65, 133. For a critique of this view, see
Gabor Rona, Enemy Combatants in the “War on Terror?”: A Case Study of How Myopic
Lawyering Makes Bad Law, ABA NAT’L SEC. L. REP., Mar. 2008, at 2, which argues that the
application of Ex parte Quirin is mistaken.
248. LEIGH SALES, DETAINEE 002, at 82 (2007).
249. See Mark David “Max” Maxwell & Sean M. Watts, ‘Unlawful Enemy Combatant’:
Status, Theory of Culpability, or Neither?, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 19, 25 (2007).
2009] PLAYING BY THE RULES 997
treatment.... As a matter of policy, the United States Armed
Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the
extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a
manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.250
Given the modern development of international humanitarian
and human rights law, it is inconceivable that there are now any
human beings not legally entitled to humane treatment. Yet the
Bush administration sought to place these detainees in the law-
free zone that John Yoo erroneously imagined was occupied by
nineteenth century pirates and slave traders.251 Further, anyone
remotely familiar with the law of war recognizes that military
necessity is already incorporated into its provisions and can never
justify departure from its rules.252 Probably the single most im-
portant step towards reestablishing compliance with the rule of law
is to identify a recognized legal classification into which U.S.
adversaries can be placed and to treat them in accordance with the
rules governing that category.253
International law indisputably recognizes two legal classifications
for participants in armed conflict, combatants and civilians,254 while
some commentators argue for the existence of unlawful combatants
as a discreet third group.255 Credible lawyering requires careful
analysis of the rules governing these categories and the practical
ramifications of their selection.
250. Memorandum from President of the United States to Vice President et al., Humane
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.pegc.
us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf [hereinafter Bush Memo].
251. See supra Part II.B. 
252. DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 16-20; HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 303-07 (1998).
253. Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from
the War of Terror, THE FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF., Summer-Fall 2003, at 55, 69. 
254. Id. at 66.
255. DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 33. There is an additional category, noncombatants,
comprised of military personnel not authorized to participate in hostilities, such as medical
and religious staffs. See, e.g., Lt. Jonathan G. Odom, Beyond Arm Bands and Arms Banned:
Chaplains, Armed Conflict, and the Law, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). Confusingly, some
sources apply this term to anyone not a lawful belligerent, including all civilians.
Noncombatants in the traditional meaning of military personnel who are not authorized to
participate in combat have not been an issue in the WAQT and will not be discussed further.
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A. Combatant Status Under the Law of War
Identifying persons legally entitled to participate in hostilities is
a key element of the law of war.256 Francis Lieber first gained
government attention by addressing guerillas and the classification
of prisoners in a civil war.257 Provisions Lieber incorporated in his
subsequent “Code” underwent further development in the unratified
Brussels Declaration of 1874258 and the first binding codification of
rules governing combatant qualifications, adopted at the Hague in
1899. The Hague Regulations’ declare:
Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to
armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the
following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the
army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomina-
tion “army.”259
The key “right” accorded belligerents meeting these criteria is
immunity from domestic prosecution for their conduct. As Yoram
Dinstein explains:
At bottom, warfare by its very nature consists of a series of acts
of violence (like homicide, assault, battery and arson) ordinarily
penalized by the criminal codes of all countries. When a combat-
256. See, e.g., Rona, supra note 253, at 58.
257. See, e.g., FRANCIS LIEBER, GUERRILLA PARTIES CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE
LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 7-8 (1862); F. L. [Francis Lieber], The Disposal of Prisoners, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1861, at 5; see also Glazier, supra note 141, at 152-59 (discussing Lieber’s
relationship with the army). 
258. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
Adopted by the Conference of Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 96, 97-98
(Supp. 1907).
259. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, art.
1, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, 247.
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ant, John Doe, holds a rifle, aims it at ... a soldier belonging to
the enemy’s armed forces[ ] with an intent to kill, pulls the
trigger, and causes ... death, what we have is a premeditated
homicide fitting the definition of murder in virtually all domestic
penal codes. If, upon being captured by the enemy, John Doe is
not prosecuted for murder, this is due to one reason only. [The
law of war] provides John Doe with a legal shield, protecting him
from trial and punishment.260
This immunity, often called “the combatant’s privilege,”261 is more
important than the standards of treatment mandated for a prisoner
of war (POW), which seem to be the preoccupation of most commen-
tators.262 Rules governing POW treatment would be of little practical
value if captured belligerents could be criminally prosecuted for
taking part in hostilities. Belligerent immunity, limiting combat-
ants’ trials to actual violations of the law of war, is really the most
fundamental benefit conferred by that law, and leads, as Ryan
Goodman observes, to the fact that these individuals can generally
be killed or detained in wartime but not tried.263 It is the threat of
trial and actual criminal punishment, or even execution, that is the
primary incentive for combatants to conform their conduct to the
law of war, preserving their place within the category of persons
who may only be detained without trial. 
Many scholars, including Dinstein, view this domestic immunity
as intertwined with POW status264—a position arguably bolstered
by provisions of Protocol I discussed later in this article.265 In 1929,
the first Geneva POW convention explicitly adopted the Hague
criteria for combatants as the formal standard for POW eligibility.266
But Geneva III’s Article 4 in 1949 expanded POW eligibility.267 Part
A of that article lists six categories of persons entitled to POW
260. DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 31.
261. See, e.g., Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged
Combatants,” 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45, 46-47 (2003).
262. See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 129 (2005).
263. Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48,
58-60 (2009).
264. See DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 31.
265. See infra Part III.C.
266. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, July 27, 1929,
41 Stat. 2021, 2 Bevans 932.
267. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 4.
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status,268 but does not explicitly state that only four of these can
ever be entitled to combatant status.269 The “combatant privilege” is
thus logically separable from POW status. A combatant receives no
immunity for law of war violations, however, only from domestic
prosecutions. It has been clear from Lieber’s time that “[a] prisoner
of war remains answerable for his crimes against the captor’s army
or people, committed before he was captured, and for which he has
not been punished by his own authorities.”270
The immunities accorded the combatant under the law of war
come with a substantial price. In exchange for the right to engage
in violence, combatants are in turn subject to being killed or
wounded at essentially any place and any time during an armed
conflict from the time they enlist until they are separated from
military service.271 If captured, they may be preventively detained
for the duration of the conflict based solely on their membership in
the enemy’s forces. Geneva III now requires combatants to carry an
identification card that establishes their entitlement to POW status
but also provides prima facie authority for their detention.272
Geneva III, Article 5 calls for a “competent tribunal” to determine
status in cases of doubt about POW eligibility but provides no
criteria for their composition or procedure.273
268. Id.
269. Only those individuals falling within Gevena III’s Article 4.A. paragraphs (1)-(3) and
(6) are entitled to combatant status. Geoffrey Corn, Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilian
Augmentees, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for
Permissible Civilian Battlefield Functions, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y, 257, 258-59, 259 n.5
(2008). Contrary to popular misconception, Geneva III does not define the term combatant
because it does not need to. The treaty discusses only mandatory treatment of persons
qualifying as prisoners of war and so Article 4 limits itself to that subject. The formal criteria
for combatant status per se is found in the Hague Regulations as declaratory of customary
international law, and, for those states who are parties to it. Protocol I, supra note 206, art.
43; see, e.g., Geneva I, supra note 26, art. 4 (discussing mandatory treatment of POWs); see
also Land Warfare Regulations, supra note 150, art. 1 (exemplifying criteria of combatant
status); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 43, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 4 (defining combatant status for party states).
270. LIEBER CODE, supra note 148, ¶ 59.
271. TOM FARER,CONFRONTING GLOBAL TERRORISM AND AMERICAN NEO-CONSERVATISM 86-
87 (2008).
272. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 17.
273. Id. art. 5.
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Al Qaeda is not a state and thus lacks an “army,” but it could be
a “militia” or “volunteer corps,” which can have combatant status
under Hague and Geneva rules. Testimony was given during Salim
Hamdan’s 2008 military commission trial that al Qaeda had a unit
composed of several thousand fighters, the 055 Brigade, who fought
for the Taliban in camouflage uniforms.274 While al Qaeda fighters
failing to wear uniforms or follow the law of war have no right to
demand combatant status, nothing in the law would bar the United
States from choosing to treat them as combatants.275
Unilaterally according al Qaeda members combatant status would
have several advantages. First, there would be no question of the
legality of military action to kill al Qaeda personnel without first
attempting their capture. The United States has been killing al
Qaeda members via airstrikes, missiles fired from remotely oper-
ated Predator drones, and traditional ground combat.276 Second,
simply establishing a detainee’s status as an al Qaeda fighter would
justify preventive detention for the duration of hostilities. It would
not be necessary to link them with any hostile acts or even to
demonstrate any specific individual intent to commit such acts.
The government and its critics have said much about “battlefield”
captures—the government generally asserts that detainees were
captured on a battlefield and critics seek to refute these claims.277
But there is no formal provision in the law of war that requires any
tie to a battlefield to justify preventive detention; it is the affiliation
with opposition forces, not the locus of capture or personal conduct,
which determines eligibility for detention. Indeed, Geneva III
defines prisoners of war as persons “who have fallen into the power
of the enemy,”278 not even requiring that they have been “captured”
at all. Third, although combatants are protected from abuse and do
not have to provide any information beyond basic identifying data,
274. Brian Glyn Williams, The Al-Qaida We Don’t Know: The 055 Brigade, WORLD POL.
REV., Oct. 26, 2008, available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2821.
275. Bialke, supra note 34, at 1-2.
276. Ben N. Dunlap, State Failure and the Use of Force in the Age of Global Terror, 27 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 456 (2004).
277. See, e.g., Mark Denbeaux et al., The Meaning of “Battlefield”: An Analysis of the
Government’s Representations of “Battlefield” Capture and “Recidivism” of the Guantánamo
Detainees 4-5 (Dec. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1089475.
278. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 4A.
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there are no explicit legal limitations on the subject or duration of
interrogations and no right to counsel during questioning.279 Fourth,
al Qaeda members would be subject to military trial for any law of
war violations they commit. A Geneva III provision that might now
be customary law calls for combatant trials by “the same courts
according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the
... Detaining Power.”280 This precludes use of the current military
commissions, which are limited to aliens.281 But this Geneva pro-
vision does allow trial by courts-martial,282 which would merit
greater international support than the current commissions, which
are roundly criticized even by close allies.283 Despite the combatants’
immunity from ordinary domestic crimes, Article III courts also
should be able to try them for War Crimes Act284 violations because
these courts also have jurisdiction over U.S. service personnel.285
These advantages must be balanced against potential downsides
to granting al Qaeda combatant status. Perhaps the most significant
is political; letting al Qaeda fighters claim the mantle of “combat-
ants” could facilitate their self-portrayal as warriors engaged in
jihad against the West.286 Treating them as combatants also could
legitimate attacks on valid military targets such as the Pentagon
and the USS Cole.287 Al Qaeda’s means of attack employed to date,
including the use of commercial airliners as weapons and the
indiscriminate targeting of civilians, should still render most past
attacks unlawful,288 but “combatant” classification opens the pos-
sibility that future strikes could be done lawfully. Although the
United States could elect to accord al Qaeda combatant status, it
might thus choose not to do so.
279. FARER, supra note 271, at 88.
280. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 102.
281. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948b (2006).
282. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 84.
283. See Ben Russell, Attorney General Hits Out on Guantanamo, INDEPENDENT (London),
June 26, 2004, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/politics/attorney-general-hits-out-
on-guantanamo-733593.html.
284. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
285. Id. § 2441(b).
286. See DAVID COLE & JULES LABEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 144-45 (2007).
287. See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 130, §§ 5.4-5.4.5 (discussing lawful
military objectives).
288. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 49.
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B. Civilian Status Under the Law of War
Although initially counterintuitive, the other classification
indisputably available is “civilian.”289 This seems illogical since
civilians are protected persons under the law of war,290 and the goal
of applying the war paradigm is to gain greater freedom of action
against al Qaeda than criminal law provides, not to grant terrorists
additional safeguards. But the “civilian” category is sufficiently
broad that Protocol I’s Article 50 declares that anyone not meeting
the legal criteria for combatant status is a civilian.291 Combatant
status is determined with respect to individual conflicts, so even a
uniformed service person can be considered a civilian if not an
actual participant in the conflict.292 British military officers caught
in Kuwait during Iraq’s 1990 invasion and U.N. peacekeepers thus
have both been held legally to be civilians.293 Any doubt as to
whether persons considered to be “unlawful combatants” could be
civilians should be dispelled by the facial language of Geneva IV’s
Article 5 which includes persons detained as “a spy or saboteur”
within the ambit of “protected person[s]”294 and Article 68, which
allows their trial for espionage, sabotage, or offenses “solely
intended to harm the Occupying Power.”295
Geneva IV gives belligerents significant flexibility to deal with
civilians posing actual security threats.296 Historically, the law of
war simply declared that civilians could not be the object of attack
but provided few specific rules for their treatment. As a result there
are comparatively few longstanding customary rules in this area.
But since IHRL should be fully applicable in the absence of positive
law of war rules constituting a lex specialis, states should find it
advantageous to recognize most Geneva IV provisions as constitut-
ing customary law and thus applicable even when there are
technical gaps in the treaty’s application. Otherwise civilians will
logically be governed by more restrictive rules such as the ICCPR,
289. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 130, § 12.19.
291. Protocol I, supra note 206, art. 50.
292. Id. art. 43.
293. MCCOUBREY, supra note 252, at 138-39.
294. Geneva IV, supra note 26, art. 5.
295. Id. art. 68.
296. See id. art. 5.
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which proclaims “[n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty except ...
in accordance with such procedure as are established by law” and
mandates an enforceable right to compensation for anyone wrong-
fully detained.297
Treating detainees as civilians governed by the basic principles
of Geneva IV and Protocol I advances U.S. objectives in several
ways. First, civilians have no right to participate in hostilities and
thus get no immunity from domestic law.298 Any acts of violence they
commit remain domestic crimes, subjecting them to stigmatization
as common criminals and the indignity of ordinary courtroom
prosecution.299 Second, like POWs, enemy civilians are subject to
preventive internment if they pose a significant threat,300 that is, “if
the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely neces-
sary.”301 The physical conditions mandated for civilian internment
are very much like those mandated for POWs. Unlike the one-time
determination made at the beginning of combatant detention,
however, Geneva IV’s Article 43 requires an initial threat determi-
nation and semiannual review “by an appropriate court or adminis-
trative board.”302 But there is no bar to holding a detainee who is
periodically reassessed as a threat until the end of hostilities.303
Third, civilians who participate in hostilities are subject to attack
while doing so. The Israeli Supreme Court held that “participating”
should be interpreted fairly broadly even while upholding applica-
tion of the law of war to fighting terrorists.304 This result makes
logical sense in applying the law of war to a group like al Qaeda.
Protocol I focused on the resistance figures who were “farmers by
297. ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 9.
298. DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 31.
299. See id.
300. See Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375,
380 (2005).
301. Geneva IV, supra note 26, art. 42. Geneva IV uses the term “internment” for
preventive detention of civilians based on ex-ante security assessments, reserving the term
“detention” for captivity resulting from actual criminal violations such as espionage and
sabotage. Compare id. arts. 5, 71, 76 (discussing detention), with id. arts. 41-43, 68, 79-135
(regulating internment).
302. Id. art. 43.
303. Id.
304. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. [2000], available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf. 
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day and soldiers by night,”305 such as the Viet Cong.306 The logic for
limiting attacks to periods of actual participation in fighting is that
it is difficult to distinguish between insurgents and innocent
civilians when both are engaged in everyday activities and there is
a risk of collateral harm to innocent persons during attacks in
civilian settings. An additional consideration is that in an occupa-
tion setting, where military forces traditionally encountered
resistance fighters, the military exercises governmental authority
and could arrest individuals isolated from their units. 
Al Qaeda is a full-time job for most personnel,307 so they may be
“participating” in hostilities through a broader scope of activity than
just heading to or from an attack.308 There is no principled reason
why these persons, like actual military personnel, should not be
subject to attack while planning or training for a combat
operation.309 But, as Curtis Bradley notes, attempts to expand the
definition of “participat[ing] in hostilities” will undoubtedly incur
some international public opposition toward the United States as it
has for Israel.310
Like combatants, interned civilians should also be subject to
interrogation outside traditional criminal procedure constraints.
Geneva IV’s Article 31 bars “physical or moral coercion ... against
protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or
from third parties.”311 There are no express limits on the duration
or subject of questioning, however, providing a clear advantage over
criminal law.312
As previously noted, civilians participating in armed conflict
enjoy no immunity from prosecution under domestic laws.313 Any
killing they commit is a homicide and any destruction of property a
305. GREEN, supra note 30, at 111 (citing Protocol I, art. 44).
306. Roberts, supra note 154, at 23.
307. LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER 141-42 (2006).
308. See ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 § 1944 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmermann eds. 1987).
309. Curtis A. Bradley, The United States, Israel & Unlawful Combatants, 12 GREEN BAG
2d 397, 401-03 (2009), available at http://www.greenbag.org/v12n4/v12n4_bradley.pdf.
310. Id. (quoting HELEN DUFFY, THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (2005)).
311. Geneva IV, supra note 26, art. 31.
312. Id.
313. See supra text accompanying note 298.
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criminal act. As offenses against regular domestic law, the proper
venue for such trials is ordinary civilian courts. Although such acts
have been punished by military tribunals in the past, these typically
drew their authority either as martial law courts, such as those in
border states during the U.S. Civil War, or as military government
courts situated in occupied territory.314 Despite having the func-
tional appearance of law of war tribunals, the law applied was
formally “domestic.” Typically, this would be either an ad hoc code
established for an occupied territory or the existing criminal code
left in effect by military authorities.315
Civilians can be tried for war crimes in some circumstances but
generally must either be inciting or directing military personnel, or
engaged in conduct with them, to be prosecuted under the law of
war.316 Most legal scholars agree that persons not entitled to
combatant status do not commit a war crime just by participating
in hostilities,317 but rather that any acts of violence they commit are
punishable as crimes under domestic law. When civilians can be
tried for grave breaches of Geneva IV, that convention mandates
legal protections at least equivalent to those provided POWs.318
Treating al Qaeda personnel as civilians thus imposes more legal
constraints on U.S. actions than according them combatant status
would, including less authority to target such personnel and a
higher burden to justify their detention. But it has the advantage of
weakening their claims to be warriors and facilitates their stigmati-
zation as criminals. It also allows their prosecution under the full
scope of U.S. federal criminal law, including inchoate offenses,
rather than the more limited set of acts constituting actual law of
war violations.
314. See Glazier, supra note 204, at 9-10.
315. See, e.g., id. at 15-18 (describing the establishment of military tribunals in Colonial
America).
316. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 181, at 133-34.
317. See, e.g., Jelena Pejic, “Unlawful Enemy Combatants”: Interpretations and
Consequences, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 338
(Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
318. Geneva IV, supra note 26, art. 146.
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C. Unlawful Combatants
Despite universal agreement on the existence of the combatant
and civilian categories, the U.S. approach has been to assert that al
Qaeda and even Taliban fighters fall into a third group—unlawful
combatants—which the U.S. holds lies outside existing legal
protections.319 First, the Bush administration excluded al Qaeda
from Geneva Convention coverage because they are nonstate
actors.320 The Bush administration then categorized both Taliban
and al Qaeda personnel as “unlawful combatants” by this apparent
logic: 
(1) they are fighters so they must be combatants, not civilians;
(2) they fail to satisfy two key criteria for lawful combatants:
- lacking a “fixed distinctive emblem”; and,
- not following “the laws of war”;
(3) therefore they must be unlawful combatants.321
Because “unlawful combatant,” like the term “enemy combatant”
which the government has also employed, is not explicitly defined
by the law of war, this reasoning endeavored to place members of
these groups outside formal legal protections. They were thus effec
tively “extra-conventional persons.”322 The government considered
them subject to detention for the duration of hostilities and triable
for law of war violations by military commissions but contended that
their treatment did not have to meet any specific legal standards.323
This logic might have been dispositive a century ago. Historic
practice held irregulars to be subject to summary execution as
recently as the nineteenth century. The French shot Spanish guer-
illas during the Napoleonic Wars, for example.324 American General
319. FARER, supra note 271, at 90-95.
320. Bush Memo, supra note 250. 
321. See Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill & Maj. Sean Watts, Hostile Protected Persons or “Extra-
Conventional Persons:” How Unlawful Combatants in the War on Terrorism Posed
Extraordinary Challenges for Military Attorneys and Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
681, 688-96 (2004). The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) also adopted the term
“unlawful enemy combatant.” 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).
322. Kantwill & Watts, supra note 321, at 681 n.1.
323. See Bush Memo, supra note 250; Frits Kalshoven, “Enemy Combatants” in American
Hands: Are There Limits to the Presidents Discretion?, in FRITS KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON
THE LAW OF WAR 575 (2007).
324. CHARLES J. ESDAILE, FIGHTING NAPOLEON 11 (2004).
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Winfield Scott established Councils of War in 1847 to deal with law
of war violators more summarily than military commissions, which
he also created, dealt with other offenses.325 He justified this on a
greater power/lesser power argument, asserting the law of war
allowed guerrillas’ summary execution so any process provided
exceeded international requirements.326
Even assuming these examples reflected the law at the time,
however, they do not reflect the law as it stands today. The 1899
Hague Regulations declared that spies could no longer be executed
without trial, and contemporary commentary asserts that this rule
applies “in all other cases” as well.327 This principle was clearly evi-
denced by the 1902 British court-martial convictions of Lieutenant
Harry H. “Breaker” Morant and several other members of the
Bushveldt Carbineers for the summary killing of Boer guerillas,
rejecting defense arguments that such individuals fell outside the
protections of the law of war.328 And a number of World War II era
war crimes prosecutions held Axis personnel criminally liable for
punishing alleged unlawful combatants without a valid trial.329 So
it seems, by the start of the twentieth century, no one was subject
to punishment for law of war violations without trial. Any residual
doubt about whether individuals can remain outside formal legal
protection is dispelled by the expansive proliferation of interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights law in the latter half of the
twentieth century.330
The existence vel non of unlawful combatants as a discreet cate-
gory is debated by experts today. Israel’s Yoram Dinstein is perhaps
the leading proponent of unlawful combatants as a continuing
separate classification.331 But other scholars as diverse as Britain’s
A. P. V. Rogers,332 America’s Gabor Rona,333 the Congressional
325. See Glazier, supra note 204, at 36.
326. Id.
327. Glazier, supra note 141, at 165.
328. See generally GEORGE WITTON, SCAPEGOATS OF THE EMPIRE (1907).
329. See Glazier, supra note 204, at 75-76.
330. See, e.g., Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of
War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 590-93 (2006) (tracing the interrelationship
between the law of war and human rights law).
331. DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 29-33.
332. A. P. V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 8 (1996).
333. Gabor Rona, Legal Issues in the “War on Terrorism”—Reflecting on the Conversation
between Silja N.U. Voneky and John Bellinger, 9 GERMAN L.J. 711, 723 (2008).
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Research Service’s Jennifer Elsea,334 and current and former U.S.
Army Judge Advocates Paul Kantwill and Sean Watts335 endorse the
single combatant/civilian distinction. This view also finds support
in both the language of Protocol I’s Article 50336 and the commentary
to Geneva IV, which declares:
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under
international law: he is either a prisoner of war ... covered by the
Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention,
or [ ] a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who
is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate
status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.337
Assuming that one purpose of applying the law of war is to foster
public belief in the legitimacy of U.S. conduct and facilitate
international cooperation in defeating al Qaeda, bullish reliance on
a legal position fairly characterized as “colorable” at best seems like
an extremely poor choice.338 But that is what the U.S. seems to have
done over the objections of the State Department, which foresaw
many of the practical and political ramifications that have resulted
from placing detainees outside the law.339 The denial of any
mandatory protections is particularly hard to justify given that
Protocol I’s Article 75, widely regarded as declaratory of customary
law,340 provides a minimum set of baseline protections that must
now be applied to anyone not benefitting from a more favorable
regime.341 Legitimate scholars arguing for the existence of “unlawful
combatants” as a third category typically dispute the view that no
specific legal protections apply and agree that Article 75 is fully
applicable.342 Article 75 protections, which are more extensive than
334. JENNIFER ELSEA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TREATMENT OF “BATTLEFIELD
DETAINEES” IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 8-9 (2006).
335. Kantwill & Watts, supra note 321, at 683-86. 
336. Protocol I, supra note 206, art. 50.
337. Commentary IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War 51 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter Geneva IV Commentary].
338. See Kantwill & Watts, supra note 321, at 686.
339. See, e.g., id. at 697 (summarizing Secretary of State Powell’s memorandum of Jan. 25,
2002).
340. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 566, 633 (2006) .
341. Protocol I, supra note 206, art. 75.
342. DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 33; Roberts, supra note 154, at 23.
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those of CA3, include requiring release from noncriminal detention
“with the minimum delay possible” and a detailed set of fair trial
standards.343 Even if the Bush administration was correct in
identifying al Qaeda fighters as “unlawful combatants,” it was
clearly mistaken in holding that they fall outside the law of war’s
protective ambit.
D. Unlawful Combatants as a Subset of Combatant Status
Though the existence of unlawful combatants as a stand alone
category is controversial, implicit support for a limited existence of
this category as a subset of the universally recognized combatant
category can be found in the fourth paragraph of Protocol I’s Article
44.344 The first paragraph of the preceding Article 43 defines the
“armed forces of a Party to a conflict” to include “all organized [ ]
groups and units” under responsible command with an internal
discipline system that includes enforcement of “compliance with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.”345 The next
paragraph declares that these persons “have the right to participate
directly in hostilities.”346 The first paragraph of Article 44 then
states that “[a]ny combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into
the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war.”347
The third paragraph of Article 44 is one of the most controversial
provisions of the entire Protocol, cited by the Reagan administration
as a primary reason for not ratifying it.348 After noting combatants
are obliged to distinguish themselves from civilians, it declares that
“there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature
of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish him-
self.”349 It allows these fighters to retain combatant status so long as
they carry their arms openly during precombat deployment and
actual attacks.350 Finally, the fourth paragraph of Article 44 states
that a combatant who is captured while failing to carry his arms
343. Protocol I, supra note 206, art. 75.
344. Id. art. 44.
345. Id. art. 43(1).
346. Id. art. 43(2).
347. Id. art. 44(1).
348. Roberts, supra note 154, at 12-13.
349. Protocol I, supra note 206, art. 44(3).
350. Id.
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openly in these circumstances “shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner
of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent
in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by [Geneva III]
and by this Protocol.”351
This seems nonsensical; persons forfeit the right to be POWs but
get fully equivalent protections? At first reading, this appears to
remove the incentive to comply with the rule requiring combatants
to carry their arms openly. The answer to this conundrum lies in
“the combatant’s privilege,” the immunity from domestic prosecution
sourced in the Hague Regulations but frequently articulated as
part of the right to be a POW.352 This is made clearer in the ICRC
Commentary on Protocol I, which notes the majority view of the
drafters is that “such a prisoner can be made subject to the provi-
sions of the ordinary penal code of the Party to the conflict which
has captured him.”353 The Protocol thus implies that there are
“unlawful combatants” who still receive extensive legal protections
but cannot cloak themselves with either the honorable “prisoner
of war” nomenclature or combatant immunity. This approach of
recognizing the existence of unlawful combatants as a subset of
combatants reconciles the seemingly divergent views that unlawful
combatants do exist on the one hand and that there are fundamen-
tally only combatants and civilians on the other. 
An “unlawful combatant” regime based on Protocol I’s Article 44
has attributes reflecting a mixture of those from the combatant and
civilian regimes previously considered. First, members of this class
are persons who would fall within the general category of combat-
ants but for the failure to adequately distinguish themselves during
operations. They share the lawful combatant’s liability to attack on
sight and would be subject to preventive detention for the duration
of hostilities based simply on an initial showing that they were in
fact fighters for the enemy. Any preventive detention would have
to meet conditions specified by international law for prisoners of
war, and detained individuals would be fully subject to the detain-
ing power’s military law.354 The difference between “lawful” and
“unlawful” combatants, however, is that, when it can be shown that
351. Id. art. 44(4).
352. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
353. ICRC, supra note 308, § 1719.
354. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 82.
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fighters failed to distinguish themselves from the civilian population
during attacks, they are stripped of combatant immunity and
subject to ordinary criminal prosecution for any acts of violence they
have committed, just like a civilian.355 They also remain liable for
prosecution under the law of war for any war crimes committed, just
like a combatant.356 Assuming that they had committed both war
crimes and general acts of violence, the detaining power could
exercise discretion as to which set of rules, civilian, military, or
both, it would elect to prosecute them under if and when it decided
to try them.357 But the detaining nation retains the right to exercise
merely preventive detention as well.358
This view is consistent with the treatment of the Nazi saboteurs
at issue in Ex Parte Quirin even though that case predated Protocol
I by a quarter-century.359 The saboteurs were directly employed by
the German military, transported to the United States in opera-
tional navy submarines, and issued at least partial uniforms to wear
ashore so that they could claim POW status if captured upon
landing.360 Had they continued to wear distinguishing clothing, they
could have conducted acts of sabotage against military targets in the
continental United States without fear of criminal prosecution; it
was the effort to blend surreptitiously into the American civilian
population that rendered them “unlawful combatants.”361
By its terms, Protocol I’s Article 44 implies that the determina-
tion of unlawful combatancy is made on an individual basis. It
makes sense that individuals belonging to a unit generally comport-
ing with the law of war should forfeit their individual protection
if they personally engage in hostilities while willfully failing to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. But the
determination of lawful combatancy cannot be wholly individual.
Even military-looking clothing can only be a “uniform” if it matches
what the others in the organization wear. One fighter cannot buy a
355. Protocol I, supra note 206, art. 44(3)-(4).
356. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 82.
357. Id. art. 84.
358. See Bradley, supra note 309, at 398-99.
359. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
360. Id. at 21.
361. Id. at 31, 35.
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camouflage outfit from a military surplus store and thereby claim
to be a lawful combatant. 
Conversely, it logically goes too far to attempt a blanket determi-
nation for all the combatants of a political entity. Hitler launched
the worst wars of aggression in history and directed some forces
under his ultimate authority, such as the Einsatzgruppen, to
commit crimes of virtually incomprehensible barbarity,362 but
that did not undermine the legitimate combatant status of other
German units. Although al Qaeda’s leaders are clearly responsible
for a number of terrorist outrages, and those who have planned or
participated in them might fairly be found to be unlawful combat-
ants, this does not prove that everyone affiliated with that group
should be categorized in the same manner. Much of the training
provided in al Qaeda’s camps was oriented toward general military
skills rather than terror.363 In addition to testimony about the 055
Brigade, images of Osama bin Laden acquired by CNN show him
accompanied by figures in camouflage uniforms openly carrying
assault rifles.364 Some units within al Qaeda could potentially
qualify as lawful combatants, and President Bush’s determination
denying the organization as a whole any privileged status was thus
overbroad.365 Each individual’s status should be determined at the
time of capture, even though as a practical matter most al Qaeda
members would probably be found to be unlawful combatants.
The ability to classify most al Qaeda personnel with the pejora-
tive designation “unlawful combatants” while obtaining targeting
and detention flexibility by declaring the enemy to be combatants
suggests that this classification offers real practical advantages over
that of “civilian.” It does allow the adversary some opportunity to
claim the “combatant” mantle, but it is more sullied than in the
pure combatant formulation. Additionally, classification as “unlaw-
ful combatants” gives greater flexibility in choosing how to prose-
cute those detainees against whom a credible legal case can be
362. See, e.g., The Holocaust, http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/holocaust.html#Death
_squads (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
363. See MAYER, supra note 4, at 73.
364. See, e.g., Photograph of bin Laden, http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/images/
binladen2.jpg (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
365. See Bush Memo, supra note 250.
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assembled and overcomes the issues that have been identified as
criticisms of the more simplistic “two-category” approach.366
The “unlawful combatant” approach has several less obvious, but
potentially quite important, advantages. First, there are no express
limits on combatant nationality. Anyone who elects to affiliate with
the enemy’s forces is subject to targeting and detention, whereas the
authority to detain civilians under Geneva IV is at least implicitly
conditioned upon them being foreign nationals.367 U.S. courts have
had no difficulty finding governmental authority to detain American
citizens affiliating with the enemy to be combatants under the law
of war in past conflicts.368 This is particularly relevant in the case of
detainees with claims to American citizenship, like Jose Padilla,
who was detained as a combatant for several years before ultimately
being convicted in regular federal court, and Yasser Hamdi, who
was eventually expatriated to Saudi Arabia.369 According the
adversary combatant status also permits greater choice in the siting
of detention facilities. Unlawful deportation of protected civilians
from occupied territory constitutes a grave breach of Geneva IV370
and now might be a war crime under customary international law
as well. So a detainee is transferred from the locus of capture to
other countries under the civilian regime at some peril. Another
minor advantage of the combatant designation is that it offers the
linguistically superior prospect of having opposing combatants
against whom to fight. It would be odd to fight a war in which the
only adversaries were “civilians.” 
A key advantage of the “unlawful combatant” classification is that
granting detainees protections equivalent to the customary rules
governing POWs would effectively silence much of the strident
criticism of U.S. detainee treatment. And no nation could object to
exercising the legally permissible approach of civilian trials given
366. See Bradley, supra note 309, at 401-03 (identifying criticisms resulting from
employment of the simple combatant/civilian bifurcation).
367. See Geneva IV, supra note 26, arts. 4, 5, 42.
368. See Ex parte Quirin, 316 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942); In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir.
1946).
369. See Adam Liptak, Justices To Rule on Detainee Held in U.S. in Terror Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008, at A11.
370. Geneva IV, supra note 26, art. 147.
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the international agreements calling for exactly that treatment for
terrorists.371
The final decision about which classification to select in dealing
with al Qaeda and the Taliban should be based upon careful
assessment of the comparative merits. It need not be a one-size-fits-
all selection. Ryan Goodman’s work shows that the option exists to
classify al Qaeda fighters as combatants and detain them under the
applicable rules for that category and concurrently detain others,
who play only supporting roles but are nevertheless a danger to the
United States, under the civilian paradigm.372 The real key is that
good faith adherence to one or more of these models should be much
more acceptable to world public opinion than current U.S. conduct
and should increase the practical effectiveness of American efforts
to combat al Qaeda and the Taliban. But the combatant paradigm,
as supplemented by the provisions of Protocol I, seems likely to be
the best choice for those whom it logically fits. 
It is ironic that Protocol I, which the Reagan administration
declined to ratify on the ostensible ground that it would legitimize
terrorist activity, is actually of more use to the United States in
combating terrorists than to its adversaries. This highlights the
pragmatic roots of most law of war provisions, demonstrating that
negotiating states have been careful to protect perceived national
interests in the treaty process. 
IV. JUS IN BELLO IN A WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA
The United States can only expect international cooperation in
the WAQT if it complies with the jus in bello—the law governing the
conduct of hostilities. Unfortunately, U.S. actions arguably have
fallen short in a number of areas even as it sought to prosecute
detainees for alleged violations.
A. Lawful Combatants and the Distinction Requirement
Although the U.S. military has played the most visible role in the
WAQT, press accounts document substantial participation by CIA
371. See supra Part I.A.
372. See Goodman, supra note 263, at 51-55, 70.
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personnel, including both agency employees and contractors.373
Much was made, for example, of the “heroism” of Johnny Spann, a
CIA paramilitary killed in Afghanistan in November 2001.374 But as
a civilian “dressed in jeans and a black fleece jacket,”375 he had no
legal right to participate in the conflict at all and would have had no
claim to immunity from prosecution under Afghan law. The CIA is
also launching Hellfire missiles from Predator drones to kill al
Qaeda leaders in locations where capture is impractical.376 Although
targeting enemy military leadership is a legitimate act in wartime
and not a prohibited assassination,377 the CIA role undermines the
legality of these actions. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon
reported that the agency had to overcome significant internal
reluctance before accepting the Predator mission, quoting director
George Tenet’s statement that “[i]t would be a terrible mistake.”378
But did anyone consider that it would also be unlawful? Although
the military has the same capability,379 the CIA was still performing
these strikes under the Obama administration in mid-2009.380
Letting U.S. Special Forces personnel conduct operations in
Afghanistan in civilian clothes early in the conflict was equally
problematic, at least for a state denying the full applicability of
Protocol I. Leading government law of war expert W. Hays Parks
asserted that efforts were always made at distinguishing combat-
ants from the general population381 and that U.S. personnel wore
“non-standard uniform[s]” rather than “civilian clothing.”382 But
373. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Two C.I.A. Operatives Killed in an Ambush in Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A12.
374. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Regretful Lindh Gets 20 Years in Taliban Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at A1.
375. Carlotta Gall, Video Vividly Captures Prelude to Fortress Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
2002, at A15.
376. James Risen & David Johnston, Bush Has Widened Authority of C.I.A. To Kill
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, at 1. 
377. See id.
378. DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 345 (2003).
379. See Eric Schmitt, In the Skies over Iraq, Silent Observers Become Futuristic Weapons,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2003, at B8.
380. Pir Zubair Shah, Drone Killed 13 at Taliban Camp, Pakistani Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2009, at A8.
381. W. Hays Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 493,
496-97 (2003).
382. Id. at 497-98.
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other accounts dispute this.383 Failure to faithfully comply with the
letter and spirit of the law in these areas can only undermine
international support and the credibility of any U.S. convictions of
its adversaries for equivalent conduct. But if the United States
accepts Protocol I as binding law, this could in fact be an example
of a situation falling within the third paragraph of Article 44 when
a combatant may be excused from wearing a uniform.384 It seems
likely that both Northern Alliance and accompanying U.S. troops
carried arms openly,385 and, if the U.S. failure to wear uniforms was
not an attempt to hide among civilians but rather simply to blend
in with the indigenous forces so that they could not be singled out
for preferred targeting,386 then it could, in fact, have been lawful.
Yet again, the United States would have to accept the provisions of
Protocol I to which it has previously objected in order to have the
right to engage in this conduct.
B. Location of Hostilities
Although geographic constraints undermine the piracy para-
digm’s useful application to the WAQT, the armed conflict approach
is hardly a panacea in this regard. Wars traditionally are contested
on the territory of the belligerents and the high seas, but as a
nonstate actor al Qaeda has no territory. There is little dispute that
the conflict can continue to be contested in Afghanistan. Logically,
al Qaeda fighters also could be shot on New York City streets
because that too is the territory of a party.387 But what of other
locales where al Qaeda and Taliban remnants can be found?
International studies expert Tom Farer suggests that the United
383. See, e.g., Carlotta Gall & Amy Waldman, Under Siege in Afghanistan, Aid Groups Say
Their Effort is Being Criticized Unfairly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at N20; Amy Waldman,
A Secured Kandahar is Now Safe Enough for Some Night Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at
A11.
384. Protocol I, supra note 206, art. 44(3).
385. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 383.
386. Parks, supra note 381, at 496-97.
387. Although highly controversial among the government’s critics, there also should be
no issue with detaining “enemies” found in the United States, or anywhere else for that
matter, if coherently based on combatant status.
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States can seek acquiescence from the nation concerned or obtain
U.N. Security Council authorization to use force in these cases.388
Once the Article 51 self-defense threshold is satisfied, however,
as it was on 9/11, a nation has a closely circumscribed right to
combat enemy forces sheltered in neutral territory if the neutral
nation is unable or unwilling to terminate their presence.389
Although still controversial, and perhaps a political mistake given
the opposition it unleashed, the Cambodian “incursion” during the
Vietnam War was an exercise of this principle.390 This right is
limited, however, to situations in which a neutral fails to prevent its
territory from being used to a belligerent’s detriment. Pakistan has
begun protesting U.S. operations within its borders,391 and the law
is on its side while Pakistan is making efforts to suppress these
militants themselves.392 Even in war, there are real limits on the
lawful use of force,393 highlighting the importance of maintaining a
climate in which international cooperation and reliance on law
enforcement are given high priority wherever possible.
C. Detention Under the Law of War
One of the most controversial aspects of U.S. conduct of the
WAQT has been the detention of “enemy combatants” at the U.S.
Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Two core legal issues are
implicated: who is being held and the conditions of their detention.
1. The Legitimacy of Detaining Those Held at Guantánamo
Although the law of war allows indefinite detention of hostile
combatants and civilians posing a serious threat,394 there is
significant reason for doubt about whether many of those held at
388. FARER, supra note 271, at 77.
389. See Timothy Guiden, Defending America’s Cambodian Incursion, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 215, 220-22 (1994).
390. See id.
391. Ann Scott Tyson, Top Military Officer Urges Major Change in Afghanistan Strategy,
WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2008, at A1.
392. See Jane Perlez & Pir Subair Shah, Confronting Taliban, Pakistan Finds Itself at War,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1 (describing Pakistan’s efforts against militants).
393. Guiden, supra note 389, at 224.
394. See supra Part III.A-B.
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Guantánamo ever fell into either of these groups. First, the def-
inition of “enemy combatant” that the government has previously
employed is both imprecise and substantially overbroad, including
an assertion that persons can be placed in this category for merely
“supporting” al Qaeda.395 For the first several years after 9/11,
enemy combatant apparently was defined on a case by case basis;
at one point, a Justice Department official went so far as to inform
a federal court that it would include “a little old lady in Switzerland
who writes checks” to an al Qaeda front organization, even if she
believed it was a legitimate charity.396 The MCA formalized the
definition in 2006 but still included any person “who has purpose-
fully and materially supported hostilities against the United States
or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful ... combatant.”397 The law
of war does permit the detention of persons supporting military
operations similar to combatants, but this is constrained to those
providing actual physical support to the war effort, such as mer-
chant marine crews, or those actually accompanying a fighting force
in the field, such as supply contractors and accredited war corre-
spondents.398 It does not include those providing more distant
support, such as civilian headquarters employees, or financial
contributors.
The second issue is factual. U.S. forces captured only a small
number of the detainees; most were turned over by Afghans or
Pakistanis, often in exchange for generous bounties.399 Many were
unaccompanied by any credible evidence that they were legitimately
detainable under the law of war.400 Initially the government had
little concern for such subtleties. Early on, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld proffered the conclusory description of the
detainees as “among the most dangerous, best-trained, vicious
killers on the face of the earth,”401 and many of his subordinates
395. Adam Liptak, In Terror Cases, Administration Sets Own Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2005, at 1.
396. Id.
397. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)-(2) (2006).
398. See Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 4A (4)-(5); Hague Regulations, supra note 29, art.
12. 
399. MARGULIES, supra note 246, at 69, 168.
400. See id.
401. Garry J. Gilmore, Rumsfeld Visits, Thanks U.S. Troops at Camp X-Ray in Cuba, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 27, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?
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accepted it on face value.402 Although Geneva III calls for tribunals
to decide doubtful cases,403 no systematic effort was made to
consider individual legal classifications until the Supreme Court
held detainees had a statutory right to habeas corpus more than two
years after detentions began.404 Only after the Supreme Court’s July
2004 Rasul decision did
the Administration announce[ ] that it had created “Combatant
Status Review Tribunals,” or CSRTs, to determine whether the
prisoners at Camp Delta were enemy combatants. Each tribunal
would consist of three commissioned officers who would base
their decision on information presented by the military and the
prisoner. If he chose, the prisoner could testify before the panel.
The panel’s decision would then be reviewed by a senior
officer.405
Despite widespread criticism, there is nothing inherently wrong
with the CSRT structure; even Geneva III provides no detail as to
tribunal operation. The Guantánamo process seems facially con-
sistent with procedures of past “Article 5 tribunals” complying with
that treaty.406
The real problem with the CSRTs and the periodic follow-up
conducted by “Annual Review Boards”407 was the lack of good faith
in obtaining all possible evidence to reach accurate status deter-
minations and the reluctance to accept “unfavorable” decisions.
Detainees frequently heard insufficient information about allega-
tions against them to provide any meaningful rebuttal and had little
opportunity to obtain favorable witnesses.408 Intelligence officers
assigned to collect information held by other agencies were denied
id=43817. 
402. See, e.g., ERIK SAAR & VIVECA NOVAK, INSIDE THE WIRE 74 (2005).
403. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 5.
404. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466 (2004).
405. MARGULIES, supra note 246, at 159.
406. See DEP’T OF DEF., COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL PROCESS AT GUANTANAMO
1-5 (2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2007/CSRT%20comparison%20-%20FINAL.
pdf.
407. See DEP’T OF DEF., GUANTNAMO DETAINEE PROCESSES (2007), http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/Sep2005/d20050908process.pdf.
408. See, e.g., MARGULIES, supra note 246, at 163-69. 
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access to potentially exculpatory information.409 It was quickly
apparent to personnel serving at Guantánamo that innocent persons
were being detained,410 but the government refused to admit any
mistakes, speciously identifying those it released as “[n]o [l]onger
[e]nemy [c]ombatants.”411 Apparently, some of those held are
fighters in conflicts not involving the United States. The law of war
authorizes U.S. detention of WAQT adversaries but not, for
example, Uighers fighting for independence from China,412 unless
the United States is prepared to recognize such conflicts as wars,
establish formal neutrality, and faithfully detain combatants from
either side found on its territory.413 But it seems unlikely that this
would be given serious consideration, particularly with the United
States committed to pursuing military-to-military contacts with the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army.414 The magnitude of the classifi-
cation issue is demonstrated by the fact that of 779 men and boys
who have been held at Guantánamo, only 223 remained in U.S.
custody by late September 2009 and 75 of those were approved for
release pending efforts to find a place to send them.415 No matter
how these facts are spun, it seems that many of those held at
Guantánamo did not pose a serious threat to the United States and
should never have been detained at all.
2. Conditions of Detention 
Guantánamo’s facilities have evolved substantially from Camp X-
ray’s original wire cages, described as being “more like an animal
409. Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing app. at i-vii, Al Odah v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 1923 (2008) (No. 06-1196), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/
archives/Al%20Odah%20reply%206-22-07.pdf.
410. See, e.g., SAAR & NOVAK, supra note 402, at 110, 114.
411. MARGULIES, supra note 246, at 169.
412. Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, Report on Guantanamo Detainees 21 (Seton Hall
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 46, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/s0l3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=885659.
413. See generally Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654, reprinted in 2
AM. J. INT’L L., 117, 117-27 (Supp. 1908).
414. See Al Pessin, US Admiral Calls for Renewed US-China Military Talks, VOICE OF AM.,
Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-03-19-voa63.cfm.
415. Carol Rosenberg, 78 Guantánamo Detainees Cleared To Leave, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
28, 2009, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/1256375.html.
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shelter in a bad neighborhood than a place to keep people.”416
Reports in mid-2008 indicated that about fifty “highly compliant”
detainees were in Camp 4, which permits detainee interaction in
communal living facilities.417 The large majority of the detainees,
however, were held in much more rigorous conditions in Camps 5
and 6, modeled after high security facilities,418 while a few “high-
value” detainees were kept at a secretive Camp 7.419 Camp 6
consists of individual eight-by-ten foot cells in which detainees spent
twenty-two hours a day, allowed out only for showers and exercise
in “small wire cages.”420 It was said that these detainees could rarely
even see one another, with communication limited to shouting
through feeding slots.421 Camp 5 may be better in that detainees can
shout to one another through their cell walls, but they apparently
cannot see any sunlight from their cells and exercise periods might
be after dark.422 Those viewing the detainees as hardened terrorists
may discount these conditions as cause for concern since most
are housed in new buildings modeled after civilian prisons in
Indiana and Michigan. Detainees receive three culturally
appropriate meals a day. Each has a copy of the Koran. Guards
maintain respectful silence during Islam’s five daily prayer
periods, and medical care is provided by the same practitioners
who treat American service members. Detainees are offered at
least two hours of outdoor recreation each day, double that
allowed inmates, including convicted terrorists, at the
“supermax” federal penitentiary in Florence, Colo.423
416. SAAR & NOVAK, supra note 402, at 42.
417. William Glaberson, Detainees’ Mental Health is Latest Legal Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
26, 2008, at A1.
418. Kathleen T. Rhem, Officials Decry Use of Outdated Images To Portray Gitmo, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE., Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=18200. 
419. William Glaberson, Man Held by C.I.A. Says He Was Tortured, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2007, at 28.
420. Tim Golden, Guantánamo Detainees Stage Hunger Strike Despite Force-Feeding Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at A12.
421. Id.
422. Glaberson, supra note 417.
423. Morris D. Davis, Op-Ed., The Guantanamo I Know, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at A21.
2009] PLAYING BY THE RULES 1023
The problem, however, is that these detainees were never
convicted of, or in most cases even charged with, anything.424 They
were preventively detained under the law of war, and these
conditions are a clear violation of international standards that the
United States played a leading role in developing. U.S. leaders
emphatically rejected the legality of the close confinement imposed
on Americans held during the Revolution. A 1785 treaty with
Prussia codified this view in language prohibiting prisoners of war
from being “confined in dungeons, prisonships, nor prisons” but
must instead be “disposed in cantonments, open & extensive enough
for air & exercise, and lodged in barracks as roomly & good as are
provided [for the detaining parties’] own troops.”425 Although a bold
step forward for the eighteenth century, these rules came to be
taken as a firm requirement in all conflicts before the end of the
nineteenth century. The Institute of International Law’s 1880
Oxford Manual on the Law of Land Warfare declared that “[t]he
confinement of prisoners of war is not in the nature of a penalty for
crime .... It is a temporary detention only, entirely without penal
character.”426 After citing this language approvingly in his 1896
military law treatise, William Winthrop, “the ‘Blackstone of
American military [justice,]’”427 explained that prisoners of war can
be “confined in a building only when such confinement is indis-
pensible for their safe detention.”428
The Hague Land Warfare Regulations expressly mainstream this
requirement into the customary law of war. Article 5 declares that
“[p]risoners of war may be subjected to internment in a city,
fortress, camp, or [other] place”429 but requires that they shall be on
“the same footing, with regard to food, bed, and clothing, as the
troops of the Government which has captured them.”430
424. LAUREL FLETCHER ET AL., GUANTANAMO AND ITS AFTERMATH 56-68 (2008).
425. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, supra note 143, art. 24.
426. INST. OF INT’L LAW, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND § 111.A. (1880), reprinted in THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 37 (Deitrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th rev. ed. 2004) [hereinafter
OXFORD MANUAL]. 
427. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 849 n.1 (1953).
428. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788, 791 (2d ed., rev. & enl.
1920) (citing OXFORD MANUAL provisions for the treatment of prisoners of war).
429. Hague Regulations, supra note 29, art. 5.
430. Id. art. 7.
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If the Third Geneva Convention does not to apply to detainees as
treaty law, then some of the obscure provisions, over which Alberto
Gonzales provoked an uproar by describing as quaint,431 such as
Article 60's call for advance pay of eight French francs per month,
may well be optional. But those who deride the extension of rights
accorded by international law to Guantánamo detainees as “offen-
sive” or “unjust”432 ignore the simple reality that these benefits are
part and parcel of the legal authority to detain individuals preven-
tively in the first place. According to the judgments of the U.S.
WWII military tribunals, detaining POWs without access to
sunlight is a violation of the customary law of war.433 If one desires
to see “terrorists” confined in supermax cells rather than living in
communal facilities with free access to library materials and
meaningful recreation activities, they need only be tried and
convicted of a recognized offense before a lawfully constituted court.
No legitimate twenty-first century legal system permits punishment
based on a unilateral executive declaration that an individual is a
wrongdoer. 
The Guantánamo approach of requiring detainees to earn their
way up to accommodations roughly comporting with POW detention
standards is also legally backwards. Detainees may be given
punitive detention for up to thirty days for violating disciplinary
rules434 or criminally tried for serious offenses committed in
captivity.435 But they cannot be required to earn the treatment
mandated by law.
The same basic criteria should apply to detention conditions if the
detainees are classified as civilians. International law did not
explicitly address civilians with much specificity prior to Geneva
IV.436 The Hague Land Warfare Regulations, for example, which
initially codified occupation law, have no specific provisions about
detaining civilians. But Geneva IV commentary on civilian deten-
431. John Cornyn, In Defense of Alberto R. Gonzales and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 9
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 220 (2005).
432. See id.
433. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, 15 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
101 (1949).
434. See, e.g., Geneva III, supra note 26, arts. 89-90.
435. See, e.g., id. art. 82.
436. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 299-300 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
3d. ed. 2000).
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tion states that it is not punitive and cannot be based on prison
models, and the treaty’s prescriptions about camp conditions are
intended to conform with, or exceed, those specified for prisoners of
war.437
The open-ended nature of preventive detention under the law of
war has been a concern for many critics, particularly given efforts
to cast the current conflict as an ambiguous struggle against
unbounded “terror networks of global reach”438 or term it “the Long
War.”439 There is also concern that al Qaeda is such a loose coalition
that there may be no central authority that can surrender to
definitively end the conflict.
As a legal matter, these concerns should not be dispositive. No
one has ever known how long a conflict would last ex ante—the
Thirty Years and Hundred Years Wars were named only after the
fact. Under U.S. law, the political branches have the authority to
determine when a conflict ends,440 not the adversary. Past wars
legally ended when the Executive concluded a formal peace
agreement or declared the conflict at an end, not when the enemy
surrendered. As long as the administration is properly limited in
defining the conflict to the scope actually authorized by Congress,
there will be a time when hostilities against al Qaeda and the
Taliban are recognized as over, even if years or decades from now.
In the interim, international law does provide for individual
dangerousness determinations. Geneva IV is explicit with respect
to civilians.441 Although Bush administration supporters asserted
that the annual review it provided Guantánamo detainees is
unprecedented,442 it provides exactly half of what the law requires
for civilians.443 And it is incorrect to think that no nation does more.
Even while denying the applicability of Geneva IV to “the Occupied
Territories,”444 Israel’s statute authorizing preventive detention of
437. See Geneva IV Commentary, supra note 337, at 383-87.
438. Remarks on the Six-Month Anniversary of the September 11th Attacks, supra note
185.
439. See James Westhead, Planning the US ‘Long War’ on Terror, BBC NEWS, Apr. 10,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4897786.stm.
440. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 213 (1962).
441. See Geneva IV, supra note 26.
442. KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDA, HONOR BOUND 139 (2008).
443. See Geneva IV, supra note 26, art. 43.
444. See Amnesty Int’l, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Respect of Fourth Geneva
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“unlawful combatants” requires semiannual judicial review.445
Despite the “unlawful combatant” nomenclature, the law’s provi-
sions, recently upheld by Israel’s Supreme Court,446 comply with
Geneva IV’s requirements for treatment of civilians, including
defining its applicability to persons not covered by Geneva III.447
Individual dangerousness determinations are not as explicitly
mandated for POWs. They may be inferred, however, from provi-
sions like Geneva III’s call for the repatriation of prisoners “whose
mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely and perma-
nently diminished”448 and optional repatriation of those “who have
undergone a long period of captivity.”449 Since preventive detention
is permitted solely to incapacitate members of the enemy from
harming the detaining power, logic clearly dictates that any
individual who no longer poses a credible threat should be released.
The largely forgotten historic practice of paroling prisoners of war
remains a legal option, even in the Geneva era,450 that could be
employed to potential U.S. advantage in the WAQT. This might be
of little value in dealing with hardcore al Qaeda members, who
presumably would resume hostile activities with little regard for a
pledge extracted by western infidels. But violating a parole was
historically considered a capital offense.451 If biometric data and
DNA samples were collected before release, it should be a straight-
forward matter to convict any detainee found to have rejoined the
fight for “breach of parole,”452 with no need to prove any separate
substantive offense. This approach could reduce the risk of releasing
Convention Must be Insured by High Contracting Parties Meeting in Geneva, Dec. 4, 2001,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE15/108/2001/en/ (follow “Download: PDF”
hyperlink).
445. Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 (Isr.), reprinted in 32 ISRAEL
YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 389-92 (2002).
446. CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel [2008], available at http://elyon1.
court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf. A helpful summary is Roger Alford,
The Ten Principles of Detention, OPINIO JURIS BLOG, July 31, 2008, http://opiniojuris.org/
2008/07/30/the-ten-principles-of-detention/. 
447. Compare Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, supra note 445, with Geneva
IV, supra note 26.
448. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 110.
449. Id. art. 109.
450. See id. art. 21.
451. LIEBER CODE, supra note 148, art. 124. 
452. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 130, § 8.107.
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less threatening individuals, such as David Hicks and Salim
Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s driver, particularly if the process
included a formal oath administered by a Muslim cleric for addi-
tional deterrent effect.453
Curiously, the United States took a partial step in this direction,
asking, but apparently not insisting, that each detainee sign a
“release agreement” stating, inter alia, that he would “not in any
way affiliate himself with al Qaida or its Taliban supporters.”454 The
agreement stated that failure to fulfill its promises could result in
immediate detention “consistent with the law of armed conflict” but
made no mention of liability to punitive sanctions.455 Breach of
parole is not one of the twenty-eight specific offenses made triable
by the MCA nor is it included among the war crimes defined by the
War Crimes Act of 1996.456
D. Interrogation Under the Law of War 
The law of war confers tangible advantages over ordinary
criminal law in the area of interrogation. Whether through deliber-
ate security practices or the practical reality of being a low-tech
organization functioning under austere conditions largely in prim-
itive regions, al Qaeda seems relatively impervious to high-tech data
collection. Despite offers of monetary rewards, human sources have
not been forthcoming either,457 placing a premium on obtaining
information from captured members. 
One reason that the Bush administration sought to avoid
invocation of the Geneva Conventions was the belief that they would
limit interrogation flexibility.458 But, in reality, the most effective
means of questioning prisoners are consistent with longstanding
453. Religious oaths were included as part of the paroles issued to Mexican soldiers by
General Scott. WINTHROP, supra note 428, at 795. 
454. FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 424, at 59-60.
455. Id.
456. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a et seq. (2006); War Crimes
Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
457. Craig Whitlock, In Hunt for Bin Laden, a New Approach, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2008,
at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/09/
AR2008090903404.html.
458. SALES, supra note 248, at 37-38.
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law of war rules, which are codified by both the Geneva Conventions
and almost certainly customary law. 
Geneva III mandates that
[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion,
may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them
information .... Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not
be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvanta-
geous treatment of any kind.459
The same basic limitations are implied in Geneva IV’s provision
that “[n]o physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against
protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or
from third parties.”460 But neither Convention has any prohibitions
on the length or subject matter of questioning, any suggestion that
a detainee has a right to counsel or to terminate an interrogation,
or any bar to providing incentives to cooperate that exceed the
basic standard of care owed all POWs or civilian detainees. One of
the Luftwaffe’s leading WWII interrogator’s successful tactics
was to take captured allied fliers for a walk in the woods, some-
times including a meal at a local coffee shop.461 The tactic of
plying detainees with hamburgers, reportedly used effectively at
Guantánamo on David Hicks,462 would be perfectly legal as long as
he was not deprived of regular meals to increase his vulnerability.
Both the allies and the Germans were able to establish highly
effective interrogation centers during WWII that complied with
these rules mandating noncoercive treatment. The American center
built specifically for this purpose at Fort Hunt, Virginia placed
detainees in two-person rooms based on the belief that useful
information could be obtained by monitoring conversations between
prisoners.463 The Germans elected to detain their interrogatees in
isolation from one another to keep them from coordinating resis-
459. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 17.
460. Geneva IV, supra note 26, art. 31.
461. See RAYMOND TOLIVER, THE INTERROGATOR 98-110 (1997).
462. SALES, supra note 248, at 86.
463. Maj. Steven M. Kleinman, The History of MIS-Y: U.S. Strategic Interrogation During
World War II (Aug. 2002) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Joint Military Intelligence College),
available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA447589&Location=U2&doc=
GetTRDoc.pdf.
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tance.464 Today, the western democracies comprising the NATO
alliance agree that even Geneva III allows for isolating captives to
enhance the success of interrogations for at least a short period after
capture.465 The governing NATO agreement provides no specific
time limit that POWs can be held at special interrogation units but
directs that it be “the minimum time consistent with the effective
exploitation of the POW intelligence potential.”466
A variety of nuanced psychological techniques were employed
by leading interrogators in past conflicts, such as persuading
detainees that the information sought was already known. The
common feature of these measures is that they center on rapport
building, not coercion.467 Today, leading experts on interrogation
concur with the historical perspective on the value of noncoercive
interrogations, agreeing that coercion is counterproductive, leading
to stiffened resolve and misinformation.468 Many of the techniques
authorized for use by the U.S. Army’s manual governing interroga-
tion would be permissible even under the constitutional standards
applied to regular U.S. domestic law enforcement.469
It thus seems virtually incomprehensible that U.S. officials would
adopt coercive practices for the “war on terror” based on those from
the military’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE)
training and the CIA’s KUBARK Manual.470 As the military’s SERE
manual points out, America’s enemies apply these techniques to our
service personnel in violation of the law of war.471 And it does not
464. TOLIVER, supra note 461.
465. See Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW), NATO Standardization Agreement
(STANAG) 2033 (on file with author). 
466. Id.
467. See TOLIVER, supra note 461, at 190; Kleinman, supra note 463.
468. See, e.g., INTELLIGENCE SCI.BD.,EDUCING INFORMATION, at vii-ix (2006); MAYER, supra
note 4, at 155-57 (documenting success of FBI noncoercive approach on Abu Zubadaya);
Steven Kleinman, The Flawed Thinking of the Administration’s Torture Advocates, NIEMAN
WATCHDOG, Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask_this.
view&askthisid=00355.
469. Compare U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUAL (FM) 2-22.3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
OPERATIONS,available at http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf,
with FRED E. INBAU, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 489-98 (2001).
470. MAYER, supra note 4, at 157-64 (describing the origins of the CIA’s post 9/11
interrogation program and its linkages to the military’s SERE program and CIA KUBARK
Manual).
471. U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS, SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE AND ESCAPE STUDENT
HANDBOOK 4 (1999).
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require the Geneva Conventions to reach this result. The 1863
Lieber Code declared that “the modern law of war permits no longer
the use of any violence against prisoners in order to extort the
desired information, or to punish them for having given false
information.”472 The 1907 Hague Regulations extend this protection
to civilians, making it “forbidden to compel the inhabitants of an
occupied territory to furnish information concerning the army of the
other belligerent or concerning his means of defense.”473
Furthermore, the techniques at issue were not developed to be
truth seeking but rather for exactly the opposite purpose. The
KUBARK techniques were those used by the Soviets to elicit false
confessions from political prisoners to justify their convictions in
Stalin’s “show trials.”474 The SERE program was intended to expose
American personnel considered most at risk of capture, such as
aircrew and special forces, to the techniques used by post-WWII
adversaries seeking false confessions or propaganda admissions.475
As former Navy SEAL, SERE graduate, and Minnesota Governor,
Jesse Ventura colorfully declared to CNN’s Larry King, “you give me
a water board, Dick Cheney and one hour, and I’ll have him confess
to the Sharon Tate murders.”476 SERE debriefs revealed to the
students that the harsh treatments they were subjected to generally
stiffened the resolve to be unforthcoming but warned that they were
at much greater risk of revealing useful information during
noncoercive encounters.477
The experiences of Americans subject to enemy mistreatment
bears this out. Despite a Code of Conduct strictly limiting U.S. per-
sonnel to providing only the required Geneva Convention informa-
tion, virtually no one could resist the coercive pressures to tell the
enemy what they wanted to hear, including false admissions of
wrongdoing.478 But few, if any, gave up any information of actual
intelligence value, instead fabricating fictional details to satisfy the
interrogators. Pressed for the names of fellow pilots, for example,
472. LIEBER CODE, supra note 148, art. 80.
473. Hague Regulations, supra note 29, art. 44.
474. MAYER, supra note 4, at 159.
475. Id. at 157-59, 164.
476. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast May 11, 2009) (transcript available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0905/11/lkl.01.html).
477. See Scott Shuger, Hurts So Good, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1, 1988, at 11, 20.
478. See STUART I. ROCHESTER & FREDERICK KILEY, HONOR BOUND 144-65 (1998).
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John McCain instead offered the names of the Green Bay Packers’
offensive line.479 Under more intense torture, he made a false
confession to war crimes and recorded a tape broadcast for propa-
ganda purposes.480 Why would anyone think that al Qaeda members
would be more truthful under coercion when the U.S. government
insists that they were trained to resist interrogation?481 Given the
limited capabilities to verify detainee statements, U.S. national
interests would be better served by obtaining a lesser quantity of
accurate information volunteered by detainees than by inducing
noncooperative detainees to make up a substantial volume of
misinformation to stop harsh treatment. The torture of alleged al
Qaeda operative Abu Zubaida, for example, reportedly resulted in
his providing information that “sent hundreds of CIA and FBI
investigators scurrying in pursuit of phantoms” and the expenditure
of “millions of dollars chasing false alarms.”482 Further, such
detainee abuse has severely damaged American credibility, may
ultimately render some detainees effectively untriable, and could
even subject American personnel to war crimes prosecution.
E. Trial
The Guantánamo military commissions have generated tremen-
dous controversy since President Bush first authorized their use in
November 2001, largely because they were intended to take
deliberate shortcuts from the procedural due process provided by
civilian courts and courts-martial.483 The MCA enacted in 2006
improved the tribunal’s basic fairness and arguably resolved the
domestic legal issues underlying the Supreme Court’s 2006 Hamdan
decision,484 but it still left substantial grounds for criticism.485
Although President Obama suspended these trials upon assuming
479. JOHN MCCAIN, FAITH OF MY FATHERS 194 (1999).
480. Id. at 242-46.
481. George W. Bush, Speech Discussing the Creation of Military Commission To Try
Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov//news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html).
482. Peter Finn & Jody Warrick, Detainee’s Harsh Treatment Foiled No Plots, WASH. POST,
Mar. 29, 2009, at A1 (quoting former intelligence officals).
483. See Glazier, supra note 18, at 132-35, 147.
484. See id. at 174-77 (describing the Hamdan holding and MCA contents). 
485. Id. at 185-93.
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office,486 he subsequently announced they could be used for pros-
ecution of law of war violations.487 Although the President uni-
laterally directed some additional improvements to the commission
process,488 and Congress made further enhancements in the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009),489 which serves as a complete
replacement for the 2006 MCA, significant flaws remain. 
Like many aspects of the “war on terror,” fundamental elements
of the commission process still lack essential definition or remain
problematic under international law, including whether the com-
missions can validly exercise personal and subject matter jurisdic-
tion in their intended role. First, it is questionable whether military
commissions can properly exercise personal jurisdiction over any
detainees when they depart from national due process standards
and exclude all U.S. citizens from their jurisdiction. This issue is
complicated by the concurrent U.S. failure to clearly locate the
detainees in any recognized law of war category. If the detainees are
held to be combatants, for example, Geneva III, and quite likely
contemporary customary international law, limits their trials to the
same courts as the detaining nation’s own service personnel, which
would bar the use of these commissions.490 Courts-martial would be
the preferred forum, although federal courts could try violations
of the War Crimes Act.491 If, on the other hand the detainees are
“unlawful combatants,” then their lack of combatant immunity
should call for trial in domestic courts under the full scope of
domestic U.S. criminal law,492 not ad hoc military tribunals applying
reduced due process standards.493 The same is logically true if the
detainees are considered civilians; lacking combatant immunity,
they also should be prosecuted in ordinary criminal courts.494
486. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Closure_Of_Guantanamo_Detention_Facilities/.
487. Statement on Military Commissions, supra note 17.
488. Id.
489. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-1807, 123 Stat. 2190
(2009) [hereinafter MCA 2009].
490. See, e.g., Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 87.
491. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
492. See supra Part I.A.
493. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
494. See supra Part III.B.
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There are also real questions about the commissions’ subject
matter jurisdiction over most of the offenses that have been charged
to date. There is no known precedent, for example, for considering
the provision of material support to terrorism to constitute a law of
war violation, but there is substantial precedent holding that
inchoate offenses such as conspiracy are not war crimes.495 Overall,
those responsible for implementing the commission process have
shown little concern for legal coherency. Omar Khadr, for example,
is charged with spying even while his charge sheet recites a
chronology of events that constitutes a prima facie bar to prosecu-
tion for that offense.496
Even if the jurisdictional hurdles are met, procedural due process
concerns remain. The MCA 2009 has resolved most previous con-
cerns about the use of statements coerced from defendants by
instituting a voluntariness standard,497 which is consistent with
both civilian and U.S. military law, as well as pre-WWII military
commission practice.498 But the continued admissibility of hearsay
creates real concern that the government might circumvent MCA
2009's prohibitions on admission of evidence obtained by torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment499 by depriving the defense
of the opportunity to question the declarant about the circumstances
surrounding his statement.
Although the rules imply the judge will be the gatekeeper against
tainted evidence, in reality an adversarial system puts a de facto
burden on the defendant to show that statements resulted from
unlawful treatment, even though the government holds all the
information necessary to do so. The commissions’ discovery rules
remain heavily biased against the defendant, with one prosecutor,
the fifth overall to do so, resigning in late 2008 because exculpatory
evidence was being withheld from the defense.500 A sixth prosecutor
495. See Glazier, supra note 18, at 185-87.
496. Id. at 187.
497. See MCA 2009, supra note 489, § 948r(c).
498. See NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, BACKGROUNDER: PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE
MILITARY COMMISSION MANUAL, available at http://www.nimj.com/display.aspx?base=Military
Commissions&ID=246 (noting voluntariness standard in civilian courts and courts-martial);
Glazier, supra note 204, at 53-54 (noting voluntariness standard applied in Philippine
Insurrection military commissions).
499. See MCA 2009, supra note 489, § 948r(a).
500. Eric Umansky, The Six Gitmo Prosecutors Who Protested, PRO PUBLICA, Oct. 1, 2008,
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refused to try a case because the key evidence against the defendant
was a group of statements obtained under what the prosecutor
determined had been unlawful coercion.501 What prosecutor is going
to seek the admission of evidence and then inform the judge that
this evidence cannot lawfully be heard?
The procedural problems with the commissions are likely to result
in an objective finding that they violate international law. Even if
the Bush administration was correct that “war on terror” detainees
fall outside other recognized law of war categories, they would fall
within the protections of the catch-all Protocol I Article 75, which
U.S. officials have previously acknowledged as declaratory of
customary international law.502 Article 75 provides “fundamental
guarantees” for persons “in the power of a Party to the conflict ...
who do not benefit from more favourable treatment” under specific
protections enumerated elsewhere in IHL.503 Among Article 75's
provisions calling into question the military commission’s legitimacy
are prohibitions on ex post facto law, a requirement for the defense
to have the same access to witnesses as the government enjoys, and
categorical bans on not only torture but also on “humiliating and
degrading” treatment.504 This last provision provides additional
support for concluding that President Obama’s admissibility bar
based on inhuman, cruel, and degrading treatment is too low.
Although largely overlooked in public discussion to date, a fairly
substantial body of post-WWII war crime jurisprudence clearly
establishes denial of a fair trial as a war crime, with cases address-
ing trials of both POWs and civilians who had no claim to lawful
combatant status.505 Trials of both German and Japanese officials
clearly rejected compliance with national law as a defense against
failure to provide treatment meeting international legal man-
dates.506 The unhappy U.S. experience with the Malmédy trial, in
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-six-gitmo-prosecutors-who-protested-1001/.
501. Id.
502. Glazier, supra note 27, at 116.
503. Protocol I, supra note 206, art. 75.
504. Id.
505. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, 5 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 25-26, 30-31 (1948) (reporting trial of Japanese soldiers for denial of fair trial to
unlawful combatants); id. at 66 (reporting trial of Japanese officers for denial of fair trial to
captured U.S. pilot).
506. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, 6 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
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which German soldiers were convicted of massacring captured
Americans, demonstrates how use of coerced testimony can even-
tually result in public concerns about the unfair trial outweighing
the desire to see retribution against even perpetrators of a serious
outrage.507
Continued use of the Guantánamo commissions seems certain to
further undermine the credibility of the U.S. government’s commit-
ment to the rule of law. It is likely to both provide negative publicity
helpful to the nation’s adversaries and further dissipate interna-
tional legal cooperation in the conflict.
V. THE WAY FORWARD
President Obama has committed the United States to putting the
excesses of the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies
behind it, but he has elected to continue the application of measures
authorized by the law of war in the fight against al Qaeda. In order
to place this effort on sound legal footing, it is necessary to locate
detainees within a recognized legal classification, establish credible
procedures to ensure that only those legitimately detainable are
held both now and in the future, and conform detention, interroga-
tion, and trial standards to international legal mandates. This
requires much more effort than simply closing Guantánamo—it is
not the location but rather the unlawful conduct that took place
there that is the real issue. 
Indeed Guantánamo is probably the ideal location for holding
WAQT detainees. Access is exclusively controlled by the U.S.
government, and the base is secure and free of curiosity seekers. It
is in the same time zone as and just three hours flying time from
Washington, D.C., and any litigation can be conveniently limited to
courts in the national capital since Cuba is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any state or other federal circuit. Unfortunately,
Guantánamo was selected for the wrong reason—avoiding any
judicial oversight.508 This fact, combined with a steady stream of
CRIMINALS 1 (1948) (reporting on “the Justice Trial” of German legal officials); UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, supra note 433, at 1 (denying compliance with Japan’s “Enemy
Airmen’s Act” as absolving failure to comply with the law of war).
507. See Glazier, supra note 18, at 145-47.
508. MARGULIES, supra note 246, at 45-48.
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public relations disasters, from the first images of blindfolded
detainees in orange jumpsuits kneeling in wire cages to leaked
details of abusive interrogations and questionable detention
decisions, may well render Guantánamo’s continued use politically
untenable.509 Although President Obama has ordered its ultimate
closure,510 virtually all alternatives proposed to date have practical
or legal flaws.
Proposals to move detainees to continental U.S. facilities such as
the military prison at Fort Leavenworth511 fail to address the
fundamental issue of detention conditions and actually make the
violation more flagrant by placing preventive detainees in an actual
prison. Solutions proposed by several nongovernmental organiza-
tions involve keeping only those who will actually be tried in U.S.
custody, with all others to be either released or transferred to third
countries.512 This sounds appealing but can only work if all those
who pose actual threats can be tried in the United States. If the U.S.
lacks admissible evidence necessary to convict a detainee, there is
little reason to believe he can be fairly prosecuted abroad. Unlike
the United States, countries not actually attacked lack the belliger-
ent’s right of preventive detention. So transfer only makes sense
when the detainee is held essentially in error. In other words,
transfer is synonymous with release, except in the rare case in
which credible evidence supports the detainee’s conviction for a
crime punishable by a third country not also prosecutable by the
United States. Otherwise, transfers would be transparent efforts to
circumvent law by having another nation engage in egregious
conduct on behalf of the United States. Defense Secretary Robert
Gates estimated in Spring 2009 that there would likely be fifty to
one hundred detainees who cannot be fairly convicted anywhere yet
pose significant danger to the United States and therefore should be
509. DAVID ROSE, GUANTÁNAMO 2-7, 10 (2004). 
510. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan 22, 2009), available at
http://whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Closure_Of_Guantanamo_Detention_Facilities/
511. Martha T. Moore, Guantanamo Bay Puzzles Candidates, USA TODAY, June 19, 2007,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2007-06-18-gitmo-candidates_N.htm.
512. SARAH E. MENDELSON, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, CLOSING GUANTÁNAMO:
FROM BUMPER STICKER TO BLUEPRINT 10-11, 13-16 (2008), available at http://csis.org/files/
media/csis/pubs/080905_mendelson_guantanomo_web.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO
CLOSE GUANTANAMO 2, 4, 6, 8 (2008), http://www. humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/080818-USLS-
gitmo-blueprint.pdf.
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preventively detained.513 But this should be done in full compliance
with the law of war. Bringing U.S. conduct within the law requires
several actions, most of which fall within a realistic assessment of
the President’s Commander in Chief authority.
A. Classifying the Enemy
The first step is to explicitly locate the WAQT detainees within a
recognized law of war category, either as combatants or civilians.
This is a prerequisite for determining when force can be used
against them, establishing detention review requirements, and
defining the scope of permissible criminal jurisdiction. If they are
broadly categorized as combatants, the United States is still free to
evaluate units and individual detainees as being “unlawful combat-
ants” entitled to treatment equivalent to POWs but denied combat-
ant immunity and liable to ordinary criminal trial.514 Air Force
JAGs reportedly recommended this approach in September 2001.515
Both the courts and Congress would likely defer to a good faith
Executive determination on how detainees should be categorized if
their subsequent treatment conformed to the applicable standards.
Given that this approach offers the greatest flexibility in targeting,
detention, and trial, this seems to offer substantial practical
advantages over treating al Qaeda members as civilians unlawfully
participating in hostilities.
B. Determining Who Can Be Held
The second step is to implement a credible process for making
detention decisions given the absence of the uniforms and identifica-
tion cards relied upon in “conventional” conflicts. While the Obama
administration has established a high-level interagency process to
perform a comprehensive one-time review of the status of current
detainees,516 it is appropriate to consider how a more systematic
513. Elisabeth Bumiller & William Glaberson, Gates Says Up to 100 Detainees May Be Held
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A16.
514. See supra Part III.D.
515. Adam Roberts, The Laws of War, in ATTACKING TERRORISM, supra note 18, at 186, 202.
516. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Closure_Of_Guantanamo_Detention_Facilities/.
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approach could be institutionalized to deal with future captures.
Under the law of war, such decisions traditionally are made by
tribunals comprised of military officers.517 The fundamental flaw
with the CSRT process has been a demonstrated bias in favor of
decisions to continue to detain, including lack of a good faith effort
to provide exculpatory evidence, and even directed “do-overs” in
some cases where hearing panels voted for release.518 But Hamdan’s
military commission verdict, including acquittal of some charges
and sentence to less than six months additional confinement,
shows that military officers are quite capable of reaching objective
judgments about the detainees’ culpability and dangerousness.519
Most lawyers critical of the current CSRTs process have proposed
a more adversarial system, including assigning counsel to represent
each detainee and having judges serve as the decision makers.520
Based on my own military experience, I believe that a nonadver-
sarial proceeding conducted primarily by line officers that resem-
bles the nonjudicial punishment process specified by Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 15521 would be a better means of
reaching accurate decisions. Officers assigned to these tribunals
would almost certainly have substantial experience with Article 15
hearings and this approach would be generally consistent with past
U.S. implementation of the Article 5 tribunals called for by Geneva
III in cases of doubt about a detainee’s legal classification.522
The single most important improvement to the current CSRT
process would simply be a clarification to all participants that U.S.
national interest is best served by an accurate determination, not a
decision to detain. Releasing terrorist-affiliated individuals poses
the risk of their rejoining hostilities, but detaining innocents only
further alienates world populations and will result in additional
517. See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 130, § 8.21. 
518. See Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing, supra note 409, at iii-iv, vi-vii.
519. Jim Miklaszewski, Pentagon Quietly Celebrates Hamdan Sentence, DEEP
BACKGROUND,NBCNEWS INVESTIGATES,Aug. 7, 2008, http://deepbackground.msnbc.msn.com/
archive/2008/08/07/1254366.aspx.
520. See, e.g., Brief of United States Senator Arlen Specter as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 14-17, Boumediene et al. v. Bush, 18 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195 and 06-
1196), 2007 WL 906694 (arguing military officers lacked sufficient independence and
impartiality to make final detention decisions).
521. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2006).
522. See FREDERIC L. BORCH III, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN VIETNAM 33-34 (2003), available at
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/jag.pdf.
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financial support and recruiting successes for al Qaeda. As a
practical matter, restoring procedural credibility calls for a new
governing directive and tribunal nomenclature. If the detainees
are classified as “civilians,” then the periodic review needs to be
semiannual.
I recommend the following specific enhancements:
(1) The governing directive should explicitly identify the desired
outcome to be an accurate decision about the liability of the detainee
to continued detention via a nonadversarial fact-finding proceeding. 
(2) The tribunals should consist of at least three officers who have
had command at the O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel/Commander) level or
above and are already retirement eligible. Preference should be
given to those who have significant experience imposing nonjudicial
punishment through the Article 15 process523 and who have been
involved in formal fact-finding, such as aircraft accident inves-
tigations, boards of inquiry, or Judge Advocate General’s Manual
investigations. Panel members should be cleared for access to
Special Compartmented Intelligence information.
(3) Each detainee should have a personal representative possess-
ing qualifications and rank equivalent to tribunal members. This
individual’s role should be to aid the detainee in identifying and
obtaining any relevant information that would assist the tribunal
in reaching an accurate determination. If the detainee already has
a lawyer, that lawyer should assist in the process as well. Because
the tribunals’ goal is to reach an accurate determination, however,
a primary representative who would be ethically obligated to
advocate for his client rather than seek truth is not desirable for
this purpose.
(4) Another officer of equivalent rank but with substantial
intelligence experience should be assigned to collect and present to
the tribunal all information held by the government relevant to
establishing the liability vel non of the detainee to continued
detention. To achieve this, the President should issue an Executive
Order directing all federal agencies to provide any relevant
information they hold or have knowledge of, regardless of classifica-
tion, to facilitate accurate decision making. While President Obama
523. See 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2006) (authorizing commanders to impose nonjudicial
punishment).
1040 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:957
has incorporated this provision into his order directing review of the
current detainees,524 it would need to be explicitly extended to cover
any additional persons detained in the future. A responsible senior
official from each government agency that could have relevant
information about detainees should be required to certify that the
agency has conducted a thorough search of its records and provided
all information held.
(5) To foster public credibility in the process, panel sessions
should be open to representatives of the media, nongovernmental
organizations such as the ICRC, and watchdog groups like Human
Rights First and Amnesty International, except for those limited
periods, if any, when legitimately classified information is actually
being discussed.
(6) Detainees should have the right to meet with consular
representatives from their country of citizenship and/or residence in
preparation for their tribunals and to have these representatives
present during unclassified sessions. This participation should help
convince the world public of the tribunals’ objectivity and provide a
vehicle by which additional relevant evidence might be obtained. 
(7) Tribunals should be chaired by the senior member with
sessions focused on fact-finding by the panel rather than adversarial
presentation of evidence and arguments by government and
detainee representatives. Each panel member must have equal
opportunity to ask all the questions he or she desires, and the panel
should be free to request any additional information it considers
relevant. It should be able to summon additional witnesses and to
reconvene as often as necessary to hear them or pose follow-up
questions that arise in the course of its investigation or delibera-
tions.
(8) The panel should have three options for its initial determina-
tion, employing the “preponderance of the evidence” standard used
in military nonjudicial punishment:
(a) the detainee is validly subject to preventive detention under
the law of war;
(b) the detainee is not validly subject to preventive detention
and should be released; or,
524. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Closure_Of_Guantanamo_Detention_Facilities/.
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(c) the available evidence is insufficient to reach a clear
decision.
If detainees are classified as combatants, then the panel should
make a further determination as to whether they are lawful
combatants entitled to immunity from domestic prosecution or
unlawful combatants properly denied that immunity. The panel
should make a further recommendation as to whether release on
parole is an acceptable risk.
(9) If the tribunal determines that the available evidence is
insufficient to reach a clear decision, it should allow a period of
forty-five to sixty days for additional evidence gathering. A rehear-
ing then should be held with a presumption in favor of release
unless the panel finds that a preponderance of the evidence now
supports finding the detainee validly subject to preventive deten-
tion.
(10) Individuals found to be detainable should receive periodic
reviews to verify that they continue to pose a threat. The procedure
should be essentially the same as that of the original hearings, with
the detainee given the opportunity to present any newly available
evidence challenging the original detention decision. The panel
should have four decision options:
(a) the detainee poses a continuing threat and should remain
in detention;
(b) the detainee poses a continuing threat but parole is now an
acceptable risk; 
(c) the detainee no longer poses a sufficient threat to justify
detention; or, 
(d) new evidence calls for reversing the original detention
decision.
These reviews must be conducted at least every six months if the
government adopts the civilian classification. There is no specific
timing required for detainees classified as combatants, but an
annual assessment seems reasonable given that this should not end
up being a very large population.
C. Conforming Detention Conditions to International Standards
Criticism of Guantánamo to date has focused more on questions
of who is being held and interrogation procedures than detention
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conditions. But confinement conditions will inevitably become a
larger issue as the population is reduced to those to be held in-
definitely. Of the current facilities, only the “medium security”
Camp 4 seems even close to complying with customary international
law standards for preventive detention of either combatants or
civilians.525
Despite Guantánamo’s advantages, President Obama’s direction
to close it dictates an impending requirement to move the detainees
elsewhere. This requires selection of a suitable location in the
United States and construction of secure facilities complying with
lawful standards. Congressional appropriations will likely be
needed. Given legitimate security concerns and the “not in my
backyard” views reflected in the Senate’s resolution that “detainees
housed at Guantanamo Bay ... should not be transferred stateside
into facilities in American communities and neighborhoods,”526 a
remote location on a large military base seems essential. There are
many potential choices, such as the Army’s White Sands Missile
Range527 or the Naval Air Weapons Station at China Lake.528 Or
perhaps the secretive Air Force facility at Groom Lake, Nevada,
better known as Area 51,529 would be a fitting place for holding
dangerous aliens.
Legally, the important issue will be to pattern the primary
detention facility on the required “camp” vice “prison” model, with
actual cells only for disciplinary punishment and pretrial or
postconviction confinement.530 A facility within the United States
places a premium on clarifying the precise legal regime under which
the detainees are held. Since habeas venue traditionally lies both
525. See, e.g., GlobalSecurity.org, Guantanamo Bay - Camp Delta, http://www.global
security.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_delta.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009)
(describing detention facilities) .
526. S. Amendment 2351, 153 CONG. REC. S9577-78. The amendment passed by a vote of
94-3 on July 19, 2007. Id. at S9579.
527. See GlobalSecurity.org, White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), http://www.global
security.org/space/facility/wsmr.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (describing the 2.2 million
acre White Sands facility). 
528. See GlobalSecurity.org, China Lake, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/
china-lake.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (describing the 1.1 million acre China Lake
facility).
529. See Federation of American Scientists, Area 51, http://fas.org/irp/overhead/groom.htm
(last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (describing the secret base and available satellite imagery).
530. See supra Part IV.C.
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where an individual is confined and where officials ordering the
detention can be found,531 a U.S. site will expand the number of
judges involved. Without an agreed legal basis for the detentions,
habeas petitions will result in disparate rulings and potentially
circuit splits, further clouding the detainees’ legal status.
D. Interrogation Standards
Despite the government’s assertion that detainees revealed
several plots under coercive interrogation, a growing body of public
information calls this into question.532 In any event, it is probable
that more helpful information still would have been obtained
through the noncoercive approaches favored by virtually all
experienced interrogation professionals.533 Any value gained from
coercive means must also be balanced against the harm to America’s
reputation, concomitant loss of moral authority in addressing
problematic foreign actions, reduced cooperation in the WAQT, and
lost prosecution opportunities. 
Although President Bush vetoed a statute limiting the CIA to the
standards set for the Army,534 coercive interrogations violate the law
of war and any Americans who engage in these practices can be
prosecuted internationally even if not domestically.535 The President
has indisputable authority to order U.S. employees to act in
accordance with the law and so President Obama’s direction that
the CIA comply with the Army’s interrogation field manual536 is an
important step forward. There are, however, concerns that some
field manual techniques may still exceed limits established by the
law of war (particularly as the manual was rewritten during the
531. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 851 (3d ed. 1999).
532. Finn & Warrick, supra note 482, at A1; Steven Lee Myers, Bush Vetoes Bill on C.I.A.
Tactics, Affirming Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at A14.
533. See Myers, supra note 532, at A1 (reporting the FBI “and other agencies” consider
harsh interrogations “unnecessary or counterproductive”); supra Part IV.D.
534. Myers, supra note 532, at A14.
535. Craig Whitlock, European Nations May Investigate Bush Officials over Prison
Treatment, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2009, at A4.
536. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
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Bush administration),537 so an independent review, and possible
re-write, is clearly in order.
If questioning is conducted for the legitimate purpose of gathering
actionable intelligence for use in the WAQT and complies strictly
with procedures permitted by the law of war, it is quite likely that
any resulting information would be admissible even in regular
federal courts. Since the Miranda standard is explicitly applicable
only to situations of custodial questioning for law enforcement
purposes,538 information resulting from legitimate intelligence
interrogation should have to meet only constitutional voluntariness
standards.539 Current jurisprudence allows law enforcement per-
sonnel to use a wide range of psychological ploys without rendering
confessions involuntary.540 Limiting interrogations to lawful tech-
niques is thus likely to allow the use of any resulting statements in
criminal prosecutions in addition to the other practical benefits from
law of war compliance.
E. Conducting Fair Trials Meeting International Standards
Preventive detention of al Qaeda personnel should be lawful until
the earlier of the time that they no longer pose an individual threat
or the WAQT reaches an end. Nevertheless, detention based on a
criminal conviction and sentence should be preferable for several
reasons. First, “hard-core” individuals might remain willing to use
violence against U.S. interests even after al Qaeda has ceased to
exist as a recognizable entity or pose a credible threat. The sentence
of a detainee convicted during an armed conflict is unaffected by the
end of hostilities,541 so trial for serious offenses can provide more
reliable long-term incapacitation than mere preventive detention.
Many Americans consider detainee living conditions mandated by
the law of war too good for terrorists and strongly prefer actual
537. See, e.g., Center for Constitutional Rights, Close Torture Loopholes in the Army Field
Manual, http://ccrjustice.org/get-involved/action/close-torture-loopholes-army-field-manual
(last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
538. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
539. The current standard should be the “totality of the circumstances” approach from
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1973). 
540. See INBAU, supra note 469, at 484-89.
541. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 130, § 16.50, at 446-47.
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imprisonment.542 A guilty verdict also attaches substantial moral
culpability to the detainee and may help bring closure to victims of
terrorist violence. 
Conviction following a criminal trial meeting internationally
recognized standards of justice should result in the widest possible
acceptance of the validity of any detainee’s continued detention.
Criminal trials applying standard American constitutional criminal
procedure standards should thus be employed whenever adequate
admissible evidence exists to support a good faith conviction.
Federal trials not only enjoy the greatest legitimacy, but they also
allow application of the broadest scope of possible charges, including
specialized offenses such as providing material support to terrorism
and the full range of inchoate offenses recognized under Anglo-
American law.543 Detainees classified as either civilians or unlawful
combatants are subject to prosecution under the full scope of U.S.
domestic criminal law, whereas those classified as lawful combat-
ants should at least be subject to trial for violations of the War
Crimes Act.544
For those cases involving either offenses committed in captivity
that are properly triable under the UCMJ, or any violations of the
law of war that fall outside the scope of crimes triable under the
War Crimes Act, trial by regularly convened general courts-martial
should be used.545 Contrary to frequent public assertions by officials
who really should know better,546 American military justice is no
longer the “gold standard.” A number of democracies have abolished
separate military trials entirely,547 whereas other heirs of the
542. See, e.g., John Cornyn, Op-Ed., In Defense of Judge Gonzales, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2005, at A17.
543. See Glazier, supra note 18, at 199-200.
544. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
545. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(9) (2000) (making prisoners of war subject to the UCMJ); id.
§ 802(a)(12) (making persons present at Guantánamo subject to the UCMJ); id. § 818
(including any persons subject to military trial under the law of war within the statutory
jurisdiction of a general court-martial).
546. See, e.g., Maura Reynolds, Messages Conflict on Detainee Trials, L.A. TIMES, July 14,
2006, at A22 (quoting Marine Staff Judge Advocate Brig. Gen. Kevin Sandkuhler). 
547. Examples include Germany and the Netherlands. See, e.g., Friedhelm Krueger-
Sprengel, The German Military Legal System, 57 MIL. L. REV. 17, 18-19 (1972); Bart Damen,
Address at the AOFA Conference: The 1991 Revision of the Military Jurisdiction System of
the Netherlands (June 3, 2003), available at http://www.aofa.pt/actividades/Reforma
JustMilitar_03Jun03/Intervencoes/ReportDamen_NL.AOFA.doc.
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British military justice system, the U.K. and Canada, have had to
eliminate the multiple roles still allowed the convening authority
under U.S. practice.548 Nevertheless, the fact that trials under
national military justice are specifically authorized by Geneva III
should effectively mute criticism of detainee trials by actual courts-
martial. But the fact that U.S. military justice no longer measures
up to the standards of other leading democracies highlights the
desirability of trials by actual federal courts whenever possible.
Although the MCA 2009 authorizes the President to try suspected
terrorists before military commissions, nothing in the statute re-
quires him to do so.549 While their early history shows that military
commissions can be used to provide “full and fair” trials, the history
of their use in the “war on terror” is irreparably flawed, and they
should be abandoned. The Executive Branch has all the authority
necessary to try any person over whom statutory jurisdiction can be
obtained, either by regular Article III courts or courts-martial.
F. Habeas Corpus
One of the ways the so-called “war on terror” is perceived to
differ from past conflicts is the amount of judicial involvement.
The Supreme Court has thrice upheld federal court review of
Guantánamo detentions. In its 2004 Rasul decision, handed down
after the abuse at Abu Ghraib came to light, the justices held that
Guantánamo detainees were entitled to pursue statutory habeas
claims.550 The Bush administration responded by creating the
CSRTs in an effort to provide an adequate habeas substitute while
Congress included language in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)
of 2005 purporting to foreclose habeas review.551 The Supreme Court
responded with its 2006 Hamdan decision, holding that the DTA did
not terminate cases already pending as it overturned the military
548. Changes to Canadian military justice were directed by its Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in R. v. Généreux, [1992]
1 S.C.R. 259 (Can.). The U.K. was required to modify its military legal system by a series of
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, beginning with Findlay v. The United
Kingdom, App. No. 22107/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221 (1997). 
549. 10 U.S.C.S. app. § 948 (2009).
550. MARGULIES, supra note 246, at 151-53.
551. Id. at 245-46.
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commission process as it stood at the time.552 The administration
returned to Congress again, this time getting statutory authoriza-
tion to continue the commissions and more explicit habeas jurisdic-
tion stripping in the MCA.553 After receiving a declaration about
how flawed the CSRT process was from a U.S. military insider, the
Court ended the seesaw duel with the President and Congress by
holding that Guantánamo fell within the scope of constitutional
habeas entitlement in Boumediene v. Bush.554 Unfortunately,
Boumediene provided no clear guidance as to what substantive rules
were to be used to judge the validity of Guantánamo detentions.
Nevertheless, after years of litigation, the Federal District Court for
the District of Columbia finally began reaching the merits of
individual detainee cases late in the fall of 2008.555 By early
September 2009, federal judges had ordered the release of thirty
Guantánamo detainees, while upholding the continued detention of
eight others.556
Although this habeas review has been criticized, federal judicial
involvement in war is nothing new. From the start of George
Washington’s administration through 1918, the Supreme Court
alone decided more than 190 cases arising from prize claims
following wartime captures at sea.557 While many of these cases
involved acts by private armed vessels acting under letters of
marque, a substantial number passed judgment on the conduct of
actual naval officers.558 Even more importantly, a number of these
cases ruled upon core aspects of executive authority in time of war,
including such seminal decisions as Bas v. Tingy, considering
congressionally imposed limits on U.S. conduct of the quasi-war
with France,559 and the Prize Cases, upholding President Lincoln’s
authority to invoke law of war authority during the Civil War.560
552. Glazier, supra note 18, at 174.
553. Id. at 174-75.
554. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
555. William Glaberson, Rulings of Improper Detentions in Cuba as the Bush Era Closes,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at A13.
556. Guantánamo Timeline: Captives Sue for Release, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 7, 2009,
available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/more-info/v-fullstory/story/1216218.html.
557. See 1 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PRIZE CASES DECIDED IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, at ix-xiii (1923).
558. See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
559. 4 U.S. (4 Dallas) 37 (1800).
560. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
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The Court also upheld the personal liability of Army officers for
civilian property damage ashore resulting from their exceeding
lawful authority.561 It would be odd if property rights provided a
sufficient foundation for justiciable wartime cases but liberty
interests did not. 
There have, in fact, been a few habeas cases brought by aliens
during past U.S. wars, including several well-known examples that
reached the Supreme Court. These include what are probably the
two cases most frequently cited by proponents of the Bush adminis-
tration’s conduct, Ex parte Quirin562 and Johnson v. Eisentrager.563
Aside from claims that hearing habeas cases represents unwar-
ranted judicial interference with the President’s prerogatives as
Commander in Chief, other objections are that such cases will
interfere with military operations and that they could flood U.S.
courts with litigation.564 The latter claim seems wholly overblown
with respect to Guantánamo detainees given that less than 250
persons remain in custody while the federal court system currently
entertains more than 21,000 habeas petitions a year.565 It seems
more credible in postulated future large-scale conventional conflicts;
more than 425,000 Germans and Italians were held as POWs in the
continental United States during World War II.566 But even if the
United States was involved in another conflict of similar magnitude,
the potential habeas problem is greatly overstated. Correctly
classifying detainees in a conventional conflict is generally straight-
forward, and so habeas challenges by the vast majority of detainees
would be clearly frivolous. These cases could be readily discouraged
by sanctioning any attorneys involved under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Moreover, future POWs generally would have little
incentive to contest their status. To do so, they would have to
declare formally before U.S. courts that they were not combatants,
which should then estop them from claiming combatant immunity
561. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (1851).
562. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
563. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Eisentrager came after the end of actual fighting but while a state
of war remained in effect pending agreement to formal peace treaties.
564. See, e.g., Editorial, Terror and the Court, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2004, at A14.
565. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF U.S. COURTS 147 tbl.C-2A
(2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
566. Jodi Wilgoren, Some Captives Recall a War and Forget Hostilities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2002, at A24.
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in any future prosecution. Accordingly, detainees who had partici-
pated in hostilities would not be likely to contest their POW status
because doing so would be an admission of liability to prosecution
under ordinary criminal law for any act of violence they had
committed.
In any event, the degree of judicial involvement in the “war on
terror” should also be recognized as the result of a unique set of
circumstances in which the Executive has sought actively to avoid
any meaningful checks on its authority and has failed to ground its
conduct on a coherent legal foundation. One can safely assume that
federal judges would generally prefer to leave wartime detention
decisions to the military and President. The real solution is for the
government to adopt a legally sound course of conduct in dealing
with its adversaries and to conduct serious good faith efforts to
classify detainable individuals using a credible evidentiary basis. If
this is done, military detention decisions would almost certainly
receive a highly deferential standard of review, and habeas
challenges would pose minimal interference with the conduct of the
war. There is thus no need to proscribe these challenges; indeed it
is probably unlawful to do so. The 1907 Hague Regulations declare
that “it is particularly forbidden ... [t]o declare extinguished,
suspended, or barred the rights and chooses in actions of the
nationals of the adversaries.”567 Although the Regulations in toto
have had status as customary international law since WWII, this
commonly overlooked provision is found in Article 23.568 That is of
particular significance because the War Crimes Act of 1996 makes
any violation of that article a federal offense.569 Therefore, the best
way to deal with habeas concerns is simply to ensure that preven-
tive detention is squarely grounded in the law of war so that federal
judges have no cause to interfere with executive conduct. 
CONCLUSION
The 9/11 attacks demonstrated the destruction possible by men
setting out with nothing more lethal than box cutters, while the
567. Hague Regulations, supra note 29, art. 23(h).
568. Id.
569. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2) (2006).
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Tokyo subway attacks proved that terrorists can acquire and use
weapons of mass destruction. Today the bipartisan Partnership for
a Secure America assesses that there is a very real threat “of a new,
major terrorist attack on the United States” with the prospect of “[a]
nuclear, chemical or biological weapon in the hands of terrorists ...
the single greatest threat to our nation.”570 Government officials
therefore must take the continuing al Qaeda threat extremely
seriously. 
The war paradigm provides useful tools that can aid in this effort,
although actual military force can only play a small part in a
struggle requiring “an effective grand strategy ... balancing positive
and negative forms of power.”571 Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently admitted that “[w]e can’t kill
our way to victory,” acknowledging the need for involvement by
civilian officials and the international community, including experts
in agriculture, education, commerce, and jurisprudence, if the
United States is to succeed in its fight against al Qaeda and the
Taliban.572 Growing opposition to unilateral U.S. military operations
in Pakistan573 highlights the practical limitations on the use of force
against a nonstate adversary with no national territory. Ultimately,
the greatest advantage provided by the law of war may be preven-
tive detention authority rather than use of military force per se. 
Terrorists operating outside the law have the key advantage of
choosing the location, means, and moment of their attack. U.S.
leaders should therefore seek offsetting advantages wherever they
can be found, particularly in law. There is no reason to confine
counterterrorism to the bounds of either criminal law or the law of
war alone when tools from both can be synergistically combined to
best advantage. Al Qaeda breached the threshold of armed attack
on 9/11, and it would be foolish to surrender unilaterally the
opportunity to employ elements of the armed conflict paradigm in
response. But it is even more foolish to use force lawlessly, impair-
570. P’SHIP FOR A SECURE AM., WMD REPORT CARD 1 (2008), available at http://www.
psaonline.org/downloads/ReportCard%208-25-08.pdf.
571. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Toward an Effective Grand Strategy, in ATTACKING TERRORISM,
supra note 18, 285, 297.
572. Tyson, supra note 391, at A13. 
573. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, U.S. and Pakistani Forces Clash at Volatile Border, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2008, at A8.
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ing international cooperation and creating a backlash generating
increased support for the adversary. Like all human beings,
captured terrorists have the right to be treated in accordance with
law. But it can and should be our choice as to which law that is. 
Legitimate application of the law of war requires abandoning the
nonsensical “war on terror” approach in favor of the serious
identification of the adversary in terms of defined political groups,
in this case al Qaeda and the Taliban. The ambiguous and
overbroad “enemy combatant” nomenclature must be replaced by
the application of a legally grounded classification for the adversary,
from which legal rules governing killing, detaining, and trying
logically flow. While the Obama administration is helpfully moving
away from this terminology, there is still much work to do in putting
the conflict on sound legal ground. Even if it is not mandatory,
treating enemy fighters as combatants under the provisions of
Geneva III and Protocol I, including the authority from the latter to
deny combatant immunity and try them under ordinary criminal
law for failure to distinguish themselves from the civilian popula-
tion, seems to serve U.S. purposes best. Although the United States
presumably can do this now by simply declaring that it accepts
Protocol I as customary international law more broadly than it has
in the past, it should go ahead and ratify the treaty to place itself on
the strongest legal ground and to facilitate future military
interoperability with allies who are virtually all treaty parties. 
Faithful application of law of war rules to the WAQT can also
help ensure the long-term preservation of American freedoms. If the
only options are a regular criminal trial or release, courts will be
placed on the horns of a dilemma, having to choose between letting
dangerous individuals walk or departing from accepted judicial
standards and allowing convictions based on evidence tainted by
coercion. Even if constitutional, proposed “special” courts or a new
preventative detention regime starts down a slippery slope of
unprincipled departures from existing legal rules on the basis of
expediency. Preventive detention in conformance with the law of
war ultimately protects liberty by avoiding the need to corrupt the
judicial system or create new rules that could become hard to cabin
in the future.
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For eight years the “war” on terror has been treated as falling
outside the express mandates of any legal regime. But as the
Supreme Court of Israel held:
The saying “when the cannons roar, the muses are silent” is well
known. A similar idea was expressed by Cicero, who said:
“during war, the laws are silent” .... Those sayings are regretta-
ble .... Every struggle of the state—against terrorism or any
other enemy—is conducted according to rules and law.... There
are no “black holes.”574
America should recognize this truth as well and place the conduct
of the WAQT on sound legal ground.
574. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. The Gov’t of Isr. [2006], available
at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf.
